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ETHICA. 



AN 



OUTLINE OE MORAL SCIENCE, 



STUDENTS AND REFLECTING MEN, 



BY 



JOHN H. STINSON. 



NEW YORK : 
PUBLISHED RY K. B. KITSON, 

ROOM 20, COOPER INSTITUTE. 



136 0. 



%^^€^H^ M^Z^^ ^^^^ 






Entered according to act of Congress, in the year 1860, by 

JOHN H. STINSON, 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern 
District of New York. 



J. P..PUALL, PRINTER BY STEAM. 9 SPRUCE STREF.T. 



PREFACE. 



Moral science is yet in its infancy. It has not at all kept 
pace with the progress in other branches of learning. And 
though many learned and ingenious authors have appeared, many 
of its elementary principles are as yet in doubt. To obtaiu a 
knowledge of truth has been my object in investigating for myself. 
Hoping to throw some light into the minds of my fellow men ; I 
offer this little outline to be investigated by the public. If what I 
have written be true, it appears to me mankind will be benefitted 
by perusing it. If, however, it should be found that I have fallen 
into error, it will not, I hope, excite prejudice in the minds of men 
against others who may be more successful in bringing into clear 
view the truths of this most noble science. Time and the candid 
examination of intelligent minds will test it. 

The Author. 

New York City, June 1, 1860. 



OUTLINE OF MORAL SCIENCE. 
PART I. 

CHAPTER I. 

ETHICS. 

Moral Philosophy is that science, whose object is 
to explain the laws of the human mind, so far as 
morality depends upon them ; and to seek after and 
illustrate the will of Deity respecting human actions. 

Every law is an expression of the will of an intel- 
ligence. "Municipal law is a rule of action prescribed 
by the supreme power in a state," L e. it expresses the 
will of the legislature ; physical law is an expression 
of the will of Deity respecting matter ; mental law 
is an expression of the will of Providence respecting 
the condition and operation of the mind ; and moral 
law is an expression of the will of God respecting the 
actions of created intelligences. 

Now if we take a view of mankind, and compare 
him with other animate beings, with which we are 
2 



6 Ethica. 

familiar, we will perceive that, he not only surpasses 
other animals in intellectual strength, but that, he 
differs widely from them in other respects. 

Man is everywhere a worshiper ; a being who has 
notions of right and wrong, and of justice, and who 
lays down certain principles for himself and follows 
them ; not because he is unavoidably compelled to do 
so, nor because, in this world, it is always his interest, 
but because he says, It is right, and I ought to do it. 
Men have been brought to the stake, and asked to 
renounce certain principles which they had adopted, 
but they said, We cannot retract, we prefer to suffer 
torture. 

Now to explain the laws of mind, upon which these 
phenomena depend, is our object in the first part of 
this work. 

In moral science, it is taken for granted that, there 
is an intelligent author of the universe, and that, all 
things were created by design. And hence, when we 
discover that, each particle of matter attracts and is 
attracted by every other particle, we know that, this 
law of the material universe was established by the 
wiJl of Deity. And when two balls of matter are 
made to impinge against each other, action and re- 
action being found equal and in opposite directions, we 
learn another law of matter established by the Deity. 
And all the laws in physics are but exhibitions of the 
will of the Creator respecting matter. 

In mental philosophy also, we are made acquainted 



Ethics. 7 

with certain laws, which show us the will of the Cre- 
ator respecting our mental constitutions. We see, 
how the judgment compares ideas and traces conse- 
quences ; how the memory recalls ideas for reflection, 
and how the imagination pictures to us scenes, from 
which we are far removed. These things are but ex- 
pressions of the will of Deity respecting the mind. 
And in every department of science, wherever there 
is knowledge, we may perceive the will of the Creator. 
Now, in physics, we see that, all matter invariably 
obeys the laws of which it is the subject, i. e. from 
necessity conforms to the will of the Creator. Beasts, 
also, instinctively lead that mode of life which the 
Creator intended for them. But man is a creature 
capable of conceiving and executing a great variety 
of actions. And it is evidently the will of Deity that 
man should not execute every action of which his' 
mind may conceive. For instance, it was evidently 
the will of Deity that, man should live in the world 
and increase in number. Were it not so, He would 
not have made male and female, and placed them on 
the earth. Had the progenitors of our race, therefore, 
committed suicide, we cannot doubt that they would 
have acted contrary to the Creator's will. To seek 
after and illustrate the will of Deity respecting human 
actions, is our object in the second part of this work. 



Ethica. 



CHAPTER II. 

IDEA OF THE EXISTENCE OF DEITY. 

The idea of the existence of Deity is very ancient 
among men. If we receive the Mosaic account of 
creation, our first parents had it. Or, laying aside the 
account by Moses, and supposing this idea to be innate, 
we may then be assured that each individual has had 
it, and that the first man possessed it. But if we sup- 
pose, with Mr. Locke, that man has no innate ideas, 
(and this opinion is well established among meta- 
physicians,) it is still evident that, the idea of the 
existence of Deity was among men anterior to the 
fabled existence of any, of the gods of the ancients. 
For, the ancients either originally received this idea 
from those gods, or they had it before those gods were 
heard of among them. If we adopt the latter hyphoth- 
esis, then this idea was more ancient than the progen- 
itors of Jupiter. But if the former supposition be 
received, then we must admit that, those mythological 
gods had a real existence. For, a man cannot receive 
the idea of the existence of a chess-board from a chess- 
board, if there really did no chess-board exist. Neither 
could the ancients originally have received the idea of 
divinity from any one of those fabulous deities, when 
there really was no such divinity in existence. There- 



Idea of the Existence of Deity. 9 

fore, men must have originally derived the idea of 
Deity from some other source than the existence of 
fabulous gods, and consequently this idea is more 
ancient than the existence of such gods in the minds 
of men. 

Now, the history of the world testifies that every 
nation and tribe, whose mind has been in any degree 
above the brute, have had the idea of the existence of 
Deity. And taking it for granted that this idea is not 
innate, it may be interesting to inquire, very briefly, 
in what way mankind first obtained it. If we receive 
the Mosaic account, God made himself known to 
Adam ; and hence this idea might have been tradi- 
tionary among his children. 

Again : God talked with Noah, commanding him 
to build an ark. And certainly, a matter of so great 
importance and interest would be frequently spoken 
of by Noah, and again by his children. But in a very 
few generations from Noah, we find that the majority 
of the world's inhabitants had lost the true idea of the 
Deity's character, and worshiped the sun, moon, and 
imaginary gods. This, perhaps, may be accounted for 
from the fact that traditionary ideas of character 
might easily be lost by people depending entirely upon 
memory for their perpetuity. The truths of mathe- 
matics and philosophy, if lost, may be again discover- 
ed by man's ingenuity ; but traditionary facts, if once 
lost, are gone forever, unless nature furnish the data 
from which a posteriori reasoning may be able to lead 



10 Ethica. 

us back to them. And in those days when science 
had not yet shed her light in the mind, men could not 
read the book of nature and from it discover the 
character of nature's author. 

But traditionary ideas of the existence of Deity 
would not be so easily lost. For, man has an emo- 
tional nature, and he is surrounded in the world by 
many things which call forth these emotions. And if 
the traditionary idea of the existence of Deity were 
once among men, the phenomena of nature would be 
continually calling it up in the mind, and causing them 
to speak of it. 

Again : Following the Bible account, the Deity has 
had direct communication with various prophets, who 
have not only taught the people his existence and 
character, but have also made known many of his 
designs. And that the Deity should thus reveal him- 
self to man, has been received as probable by the 
world's inhabitants. For, almost every people on 
earth have had prophets, and by them received genuine 
or suppositious revelations. But again : If we believe 
with many of the ancients, that man appeared upon 
the earth, at the first, a mute animal, without any 
knowledge of his origin or destiny, and by gradually 
progressing he attained to all the knowledge which 
he now possesses, the following hypotheses may be 
worthy of consideration. 

Socrates endeavored to prove to Aristodemus the 
existence of a Creator from the marks of design ex- 



Idea op the Existence of Deity. 11 

hibited in creation. This argument from design had 
been thought of before the time of Socrates, and in 
recent times it has been clearly and fully illustrated 
by Paley. And it is possible that mankind might 
have thus derived the idea of the Deity's existence. 
In all nature we perceive the finest mechanism ; one 
thing made with an exact adaptation to another. 

But it is evident, that before this argument was dis- 
covered or appreciated, men must have had consider- 
able intellectual cultivation ; while the idea of Deity's 
existence, most probably, commenced in a very rude 
and ignorant age. And even though a few master- 
minds should have obtained this idea, it is not very 
probable that the mass of mankind could have been 
made to appreciate the argument, or to believe the phi- 
losophers. 

But again ; in this world, men frequently see their 
best laid plans frustrated, their expectations blasted, 
and their brightest hopes extinguished. And in the 
history of the dead and among the living, we find 
many men attributing their misfortunes to inexorable 
fate. In such a mood of mind it might be natural for 
men to suppose that there was a superior intelligence 
operating against them. 

But again ; if we study human nature we wiJl find 
that it is the constitutional bent of man to attribute 
animation to natural phenomena, which are not under- 
stood, and which appear strange and exciting. The 
ancient Greeks supposed the electricity excited in 



12 Ethica. 

amber to be animation ; and this tendency of mind 
may be noticed in all ignorant nations. And as we 
go back in the world's history, we find that the farther 
we go back the stronger were the emotions raised in 
men's minds by natural objects. This may be learned 
by a perusal of the writings of the ancients, which have 
come down to us. The minds of the ancient Hebrew 
and Greek poets were undoubtedly impressed more 
strongly than the most sensitive intellect of later times. 
For, in their writings we find the greatest number 
of instances, and the finest specimens of the sublime. 
And in those ancient days before science had ex- 
plained the causes of things, men must have been con- 
tinually excited in the highest degree. Eclipses of 
the sun and moon, hurricanes, thunder and lightning, 
earthquakes, etc., must have terribly excited them. 
And in such cases, nothing could be more natural than 
to suppose these phenomena to be animated beings 
possessed of superior intelligence and power. And 
so far as we can learn from profane history, the most 
ancient worship was that of natural phenomena, to 
wit, of the sun and moon. And when knowledge had 
increased, it would be a natural and easy transition of 
mind, to suppose these phenomena to be merely agents 
of the will of a ruling intelligence. For our purpose, 
however , ? it matters not in what manner men obtained 
the idea of Deity's existence. All we need is, that 
his existence be admitted, and that the idea of a 
divine existence be among men. 



Human Action. 13 

CHAPTER III. 

HUMAN ACTION. 

Human action is an effect produced by the exertion 
of man. And as all exertion which man can put 
forth originates in the mind, let us examine the mind 
so far as may be necessary to understand in what 
manner actions are brought about. 

The mind has two capacities ; the one active and 
the other passive. In its passive capacity, it receives 
impressions ; and these impressions produce effects, 
according to the laws which the Deity has established. 
Thus : if rays of light reflected from an object, enter 
the eye and form an image upon the retina, and the 
optic nerve be perfect, the mind receives an impres- 
sion ; and the effect produced by this impression is the 
consequent ideas of form or color. And if any sen- 
sation whatever affect the body, the mind in its passive 
capacity receives the impression, and a consequent 
effect is the result. Again ; the mind in its passive 
capacity receives impressions from mere ideas, and the 
legitimate effects follow. Thus : by listening to a 
witty discourse we are made merry, and by reading a 
pathetic tale we become sad. Let us next point out a 
few things concerning the active capacity of the mind. 
And first — of conception. By conception we mean that 



14 Ethic a. 

power which the mind possesses of viewing actions, 
circumstances, relations, etc., in idea. Thus : if a 
man desire to fell a tree, the mind has the power of 
viewing that action in idea, before it has been accom- 
plished. 

Second — of the judgment. The power of judgment 
is exercised in two ways. After tlfe mind has a con- 
ception of a color, a solid, grass, tree, etc., it has the 
power of telling whether any two of these things 
agree or disagree. Again ; from certain known laws, 
the mind has the power of telling what consequent 
will follow a given antecedent. Thus : a man wiio 
sets fire to a barn, can easily foretell, from the known 
laws of combustion, its consequent destruction. 

Third — of the will. When a man has a conception 
of an action, the mind has the power of determining 
to do, or to refrain from it. And this power of the 
mind is called the will. These remarks, I apprehend, 
will be sufficient to enable us to trace all human 
actions from their origin in the mind of the actor to 
their final accomplishment. 

Now, human actions, with reference to the mind 
of the actor, may be divided into three classes, viz : 
intentional, accidental and experimental actions. And 
First — of intentional actions. First, a conception of 
a given action must be formed in the mind of the 
actor ; second, the will must be determined to accom- 
plish it ; then, a sufficient knowledge of the nature of 
things to adopt those means whose inherent qualities, 



Human Action. 15 

if properly directed, will accomplish the will's deter- 
mination ; and sufficient skill in directing these qual- 
ities must be possessed, or the action cannot be 
brought about. Thus : if a person propose to shoot 
a deer, a rifle, gunpowder and lead, are his means. Of 
the nature of these he must have sufficient knowledge, 
and he must also Have sufficient skill in directing them. 

Now, the knowledge of the nature of things, is 
gained by reflecting upon the impressions received by 
the mind in its passive capacity, i. e., by experience. 

Skill, is the making things square with sound judg- 
ment. And the squaring by the judgment constitutes 
intention, i. e., the adapting means to accomplish an 
end ; as, I am cutting timber with the intention of 
building a house. 

Now, whenever an intentional action has been ac- 
complished, the knowledge of the nature of things has 
previously been obtained. Hence, the conception, the 
determination of the will, and the intention, bring 
about all intentional actions. 

Second — of accidental actions. These are brought 
about by a man's aiming to produce an intentional 
action ; but from ignorance of the nature of the 
means employed, from unskillfulness in directing the 
means, or from the unperceived intervention of some 
object, an effect is produced different from the one de- 
signed. Thus : if a man aim a rifle at a deer, but by 
the ball's touching a tree, it glances and kills a per- 
son ; this is a case of the unperceived intervention of 



16 Ethica. 

an object. Again ; if a physician endeavor to restore 
a sick man to health, but through ignorance of the 
disease, or of the properties of the medicines, he ad- 
ministers that which will have a contrary effect ; this 
is a case of the ignorance of the means. We need 
not illustrate further. 

Third — of experimental actions. And these are 
brought about when a man puts forth exertion to 
accomplish an intentional action, which he designs to 
be an antecedent to some consequent one, of which, as 
yet, he has no conception. The effects produced by 
experiments in chemistry are actions of this kind, to 
the first discoverer. Thus : an experimenter may put 
together two or more different gases to see what will 
be the result. Now, he has already obtained the 
gases ; and the putting them together is an action 
which he understands ; and he accomplishes this in- 
tentional action, designing it as an antecedent to some 
consequent effect, with which he desires to become 
acquainted. 

Having said this much concerning actions, with 
reference to the mind of the actor, let us now con- 
sider them with reference to the objects upon which 
they are produced. 

Now, with reference to the objects, actions may be 
divided into two classes, viz : effects produced upon 
mind, and upon matter. And when any effect is to 
be produced upon mind or matter, it must obviously 
be brought about in conformity to fixed laws. The 



Human Action. 17 

laws of mind are treated of in works upon mental 
philosophy ; those of matter in works upon physics. 
These laws of mind and of matter are understood to 
some extent by the unlettered. At the present state of 
science they are not fully understood by any body. 

But, I apprehend that every person's observation 
will have made him sufficiently acquainted with these 
laws, to understand the manner in which actions are 
brought about upon objects. 

Let us, first, examine in what manner a man may 
produce effects — actions, upon his own mind ; second, 
how he may produce actions upon the minds of others ; 
and third, in what manner actions upon matter are 
brought about. 

If a person, without the aid of instructors or books, 
investigate a subject and convince himself of certain 
facts or conclusions, of which he was ignorant before, 
he has produced an effect upon his own mind ;• he has 
accomplished a human action upon his mind. Every 
discoverer, in this manner, produces effects upon his 
mind. But a man may produce effects upon his own mind 
in other ways. It is found that every object in the 
universe, when it impresses the mind, produces effects 
of some kind or other. Mere ideas, as we remarked 
above, produce their legitimate effects. Beauty, de- 
formity, superiority, intelligence, stupidity, &c , each 
affect the mind in a certain manner. If then, a man 
desire to produce a certain effect upon his own mind, 
he need but repeatedly present the object adapted to 
3 



18 Ethica. 

produce this effect, and the action will follow. For, 
by the laws of our Constitution, a man can no more 
present to his mind, even in idea, any object without 
experiencing the mental effect which the object is 
adapted to produce, than he can hold alive coal of fire 
in his hand, without experiencing the physical effect it 
is adapted to produce. A man, however, may be mas- 
ter of himself and present most frequently to his mind 
whatsoever objects or ideas he may choose, and con- 
sequently produce most frequently those effects which 
he may desire. Every one knows that man has pas- 
sions, and that there are objects calculated to excite 
them. The devout man may become more devout by 
reflecting upon divinity ; the wicked man may become 
more wicked by reflecting upon crime, and happily, the 
latter, by checking his mind and reflecting upon noble 
objects, may produce opposite effects, and change his 
own character. 

Hence, a man may bring any object to produce sen- 
sation upon his body, or he may hold before his mind 
ideas of real or imaginary objects, and by so doing 
produce effects upon his own mind. The active capaci- 
ty of the mind may, therefore, be brought to bear upon 
its passive capacity, and thus produce effects upon 
itself. 

Let us next examine in what manner a man may pro- 
duce effects upon the minds of others. And as all 
exertion originates in the mind, when this exertion 
makes to accomplish an action externally upon mind 



Human Action. 19 

or matter, the first effect is the putting the corporeal 
faculties of the actor in motion. Hence the corporeal 
faculties of an actor are active media, while those of 
the recipient are passive media, in all human actions 
produced by one mind upon another. And for pro- 
ducing actions upon the minds of others, the means 
made use of are oral conversation and instruction, 
signs and motions of the hands and face, as used by 
the deaf; written signs, as algebraic formulas and the 
diagrams in several of the sciences ; experiments ex- 
hibited to the senses ; and written language. By 
the use of these means, men may produce on the minds 
of others almost every effect which the human mind is 
capable of receiving. One man may, viva voce, teach 
science to others ; another may lead the minds of his 
fellow men into error ; passions may be inflamed by 
oral or written compositions ; prejudices may be awak- 
ened or eradicated by books ; and aversions may be 
produced even by jesture. Since the invention of the 
printing press, the facility for producing effects upon 
mind has been astonishingly increased. 

A single thought conveyed by language written upon 
paper, will frequently produce effects upon millions 
of minds. 

Let us next consider actions upon matter. All ex- 
ertion originates in the mind ; the first effect produc- 
ed upon matter by this exertion is the putting the body 
in motion. Thus, if a man desire to pick up a stick, 
the exertion of mind first moves and directs the arms 



20 Ethic a. 

and hands, and these then move the stick. And it is 
obvious, that if the human mind were not thus myste- 
riously connected with a material mechanism, whose 
forces it can employ, it could produce no effect what- 
ever upon external objects. Hence, from what we have 
said, it will be easy to understand in what manner all 
human actions upon matter are brought about. The 
exertion of the mind puts into operation the mechanical 
forces of the body, and directs them to a given object ; 
this object possesses inherent qualities which the 
forces of the body direct, and so on until the final 
action has been accomplished. 

Hence, all human actions upon matter are brought 
about by the powers of qualities of objects, and by 
powers obtained from mechanical arrangements of 
materials, which powers are put in force and direct- 
ed bv the exertion of the human mind. 



Eight and Wrong. 21 

CHAPTER IV. 

OF RIGHT AND WRONG. 

Right and wrong are ideas. They are not affec- 
tions, emotions or impulses. And like all ideas, they 
are derived in some manner. Let us inquire then, in 
what manner these ideas are obtained. Take a par- 
ticular case. Two boys bring their slates with a cer- 
tain arithmetical question upon them to the teacher, 
who, after examining them, pronounces the first boy's 
work to be right, and the other's to be wrong. Now, 
what does right and wrong mean here ? I apprehend 
any person who reflects upon the question, will say, 
that the teacher pronounced the first boy's work to be 
right because it conformed to the established rules of 
arithmetic ; and the other's wrong, because it did not 
conform to these rules. Right, then, in this case, is 
conformity to the rules of arithmetic ; and wrong, non- 
conformity. Take another. Two pupils endeavor to 
play a piece of music upon the piano, the teacher look- 
ing on, says to the first, you play it right, and to the 
second, you play it wrong. In this case, it is evident 
that right and wrong are determined by the conform- 
ity or nonconformity to the rules of music. Take an 
other case. Two men start from Philadelphia, to go 
to Reading ; the one travels on the Reading turnpike, 



22 Ethica. 

but the other steers his course through New Jersey* 
After travelling a few hours, the first inquires if he be 
on the right road, and is told that he is ; the second 
also inquires, and is told that he is wrong. Here 
right and wrong are conformity or nonconformity to 
geographical lines. And we might produce thousands 
of cases, and we would always find that right is con- 
formity to some established rule, law, or demarkation. 
And it is plain that, there are a great many kinds 
of right ; each differing from others, as the conformity 
is to different rules, laws or demarkations. There is 
physical right, i. e. conformity to the laws of physics, 
mental right, geographical right, mathematical right, 
mechanical right, &c. And each of these rights has 
its corresponding wrong. And Blackstone divides 
the wrongs, of which municipal law takes cognizance, 
into mala per se and mala prohibita ; the first being 
a violation of the laws of God, and the latter, of the 
laws of man. Let us now consider what we mean by 
moral right and wrong. And moral right and wrong 
I apprehend, are determined in the same manner that 
all other rights and wrongs are ; the conformity or 
nonconformity being to the will of Deity. And wheth- 
er any action be morally right or wrong, can be ascer- 
tained only by comparing it with this standard. Now 
I apprehend, it will be admitted by every person who 
reflects, that the will of Deity, if known, is a sure rule 
in all cases. And no person will presume to judge 
the Almighty in any case. The will of Deity, then, is 



Right and Wrong. 23 

conclusive and ultimative. And that all men do ob- 
tain their ideas of moral right and wrong in this man- 
ner is abundantly proved by facts. Do not all Chris- 
tains search the scriptures to discover God's revealed 
will, that they may know whether certain actions be 
morally right or wrong ? And is not the difference of 
opinion respecting the Deity's will, the very thing that 
makes one denomination act in a manner different 
from another? Is not the Baptist immersed, and the 
Episcopalian confirmed by a bishop because each 
thinks he is acting in conformity to the will of God, 
and therefore it is morally right? Do not all men 
throughout the world shape their actions, when they 
act in view of moral obligation, to the will or to what 
they suppose to be the will of Deity? And if we ob- 
serve a child, I apprehend we must discover, that 
it will imitate any action which it sees others do ; and 
though it may be restrained by fear, it will not refrain 
from that action on moral principle until there is in- 
stilled into its mind, that there is a good man or Deity 
who ever sees it, and frowns upon such actions. And 
I apprehend, we have many ideas which are derived 
by a process precisely similar to that of right and 
wrong. For instance, how do we derive the idea of 
difference ? We evidently think of one thing and then 
another, and compare the one with the other. And if 
the mind did not use this process, we could have no 
idea of difference. So also of resemblance of conform- 
ity, of contingency, and many others. And in this 



24 Ethica. 

manner, I apprehend, we derive the ideas of all kinds 
of right and wrong. And from this, it follows, that 
if men cannot agree respecting the will of Deity con- 
cerning a given action, they never can agree respect- 
ing the moral quality of that action. And hence the 
fact, that what is regarded as evidently morally right 
by one set of men, is regarded as evidently morally 
wrong by another, is easily accounted for. This con- 
trariety of opinion always has existed, and always 
must exist, until the real will of Deity shall be made 
evident to the minds of all men. And this, I appre- 
hend, explains all the phenomena of moral right and 
wrong which exist in the world. 

It will be perceived, that the human mind might de- 
rive ideas of all kinds of right except moral right, 
were there no idea of the existence of the Deity in the 
world. But were all ideas of Deity blotted from the 
mind, moral right and wrong would be swept away 
with them. And as the Deity is the creator of all 
things, moral law, which expresses the Deity's will 
respecting human actions, cannot clash with any men- 
tal or physical law. And so far as men would obey 
the mental and physical laws of their constitution, ttius 
far but no farther, they would obey moral law. But 
we must notice some of the objections to what we have 
said. Examples from ancient Greece and Rome are 
brought forward to show that men do not derive their 
notions of moral right from the Deity. 

11 The paganism of the ancient world produced, in- 



Right and Wrong. 25 

deed, abominable gods, who on earth would have been 
shunned or punished as monsters ; and who offered as 
a picture of supreme happiness, only crimes to commit 
and passions to satiate. But vice armed with this 
sacred authority descended in vain from the eternal 
abode ; she found in the heart of man a moral instinct 
to repel her. The continence of Xenocrates was ad- 
mired by those who celebrated the debaucheries of Ju- 
piter. The chaste Lucretia adored the unchaste Ve- 
nus. The most intrepid Roman sacrificed to fear. 
He invoked the god who dethroned his father, and died 
without a murmur by the hand of his own. The most 
contemptible divinities were served by the greatest 
men. The holy voice of nature stronger than that of 
the gods, made itself heard and respected and obeyed 
on earth, and seemed to banish to the confines of hea- 
ven, guilt and the guilty."* This argument seems to 
show that men do not derive the ideas of moral right 
and wrong from what is, or what they suppose to be, 
the will of Deity, but that these ideas are derived from 
our constitution. It must be recollected, however, 
that the idea of Deity was among men long before the 
existence of the gods spoken of by Rosseau. 

Mythologists suppose that those gods were once 
men who had acted a conspicuous part on earth, and 
after death had been deified. However this may be, 
it is at least evident, that the ancient pagans at some 

c Quoted from Rosseau by Wayland. 



26 Ethica. 

period made those gods. And of course, they must 
have had previous ideas of divinity, or they could have 
deified nothing. The idea must always exist, before 
it can be given habitation or character. 

Greece indeed, attributed human passions of the 
basest sort to a divine existence. But the idea of a 
divine existence was not derived from those gods. On 
the contrary those gods originated from this idea. 
And Greece herself made them, prescribed laws for 
them, assigned them their dominion, and attributed to 
them actions. And had every idea of those fabulous 
gods been blotted from the mind of the pagan world, 
the idea of divinity would have remained. When the 
religion of a country changes, all that makes part of 
that religion is frequently swept away. The idea of 
divinity, however, which is the foundation of every re- 
ligion, remains ; and upon this the succeeding religion 
is reared. When the pagan religion fell, the gods 
were annihilated, for they were but part of a religious 
structure, and not the foundation upon which the 
structure was built. A substratum of a crude natural 
theology underlies every religion which has or does 
exist in the world. Again, the great men of Greece 
and Rome had an idea of Deity entirely distinct and 
exclusive of those fabled gods, as taught by mycolo- 
gist, poet or priest. 

The idea of the existence of a divine intelligence, 
who had created all things, existed in Egypt before 
the Grecian history commences. And in Greece this 



Right and "Wrong. 27 

idea was believed and taught by Thales, by Anaxago- 
ras, Socrates, and by Piato and the whole Socratic 
school. Subsequently the Boinan philosophers taught 
the same thing. Again, it is not the fact, that the 
ideas which the great men of Greece and Rome enter- 
tained respecting the character of Divinity, corres- 
ponded at all with the characters which the mytholo- 
gists, poets and priests attributed to the gods. The 
writings of Plato and Cicero exhibit far nobler notions. 
And respecting those gods themselves, the same lan- 
guage which in a later period of Roman history, Gib- 
bon applies to the men of Rome, may with much pro- 
priety be applied to the more ancient history of Rome 
and Greece. " Many," says Gibbon, " considered them 
(the religions of polytheism) as equally true, many as 
equally false, and many as equal 1 y jolitie." 

There were, no doubt, many who never employed 
their minds in reflecting, but took those gods as exam- 
ples. And as were their gods, so were they. And let 
any one carefully observe the Indian, or any other 
heathen nation, and I apprehend, he will be convinced 
that their moral notions exactly correspond with their 
ideas of the will of the Great Spirit or Deity. 

But it is said, that we have a constitutional moral 
sense from which we derive our notions of right and 
wrong. Now, if our minds be thus constituted, we can 
detect moral right and wrong by an appeal to this in- 
ternal sense. For instance, to our constitutions we 
appeal to ascertain whether an apple be sour or sweet, 



28 Ethica. 

and our organs of taste are so constituted as to give 
us the ideas of these qualities. And to another part of 
our constitution we appeal for our idea of black and 
white. Let us, then, make this appeal to our consti- 
tutions for the ideas of moral right and wrong. To 
worship idols made by hands, is wrong, says the 
Christian. These are our gods, and it is right to pros- 
trate ourselves before them, say the Hindoos. And 
we need not adduce and multiply examples to show 
the contrariety of opinion in regard to what action is 
right and what wrong ; for the examples are as num- 
erous as the actions which involve the question of 
moral rigkt and wrong. And hence it is evident, that 
different individuals attribute opposite moral qualities 
to the same object. Suppose now, we present an ob- 
ject for different individuals to determine the color. 
The first says, it is black ; the second, it is white ; the 
third, it is red ; and the fourth, it is green. Now the 
object must either be a chameleon, or these persons 
must have differently constituted organizations. It 
may be said, that these persons must have had previous 
ideas of black, green, &c, or they could not have pre- 
dicated either of the qualities of the object. But black 
and green are recognized because we are constituted 
to perceive them by the sense of sight. And we see 
black the first time an object possessing it is presented 
to our eyes. And having given this quality a name, 
we affirm it of other objects, which we perceive to pos- 
sess it. 



Eight and Wrong. 29 

And it is to be observed, that through all our con- 
stitutional senses we derive the knowledge of the ex- 
istence of any quality, from some object in which this 
quality is inherent. Thus, were not some object pos- 
sessing inherent sweetness presented to our taste, we 
would never know that such a quality was in existence. 
And there may be many qualities in an object of which 
we know nothing, because we have no sense to make 
us acquainted with them. But when an object posses- 
sing a certain quality is presented for the first time 
to the appropriate sense, we then, for the first time, 
perceive that there is such a quality in existence. If 
then, we obtain the knowledge of moral right through 
a constitutional sense, some actions, in which this qual- 
ity is inherent, must be presented to this sense or we 
could never know that right existed. Now, if we ad- 
mit, that there are a few actions which all mankind 
acknowledge to be*right, i. e., to have this quality in- 
herent in them, and, that from these actions men de- 
rive the notion of moral right ; the moral sense hypo- 
thesis will still fail to account for the difference of 
opinion respecting other actions. Suppose each of six 
men to taste of each of six apples, and they all agree 
that all of these apples have the same taste, i. e. pos- 
sess a certain quality, to which quality they give the 
name of sweet. Suppose also, they all taste of six 
other apples, and agree that these all possess a certain 
quality very different from the first, to which quality 
they give the name of sour. Now if these men's consti- 
4 



30 Ethica. 

tutions be alike when they use the term sweet, they 
will all have the same notion of the quality spoken of. 
And so also of sour. 

Suppose now, six other apples be introduced. Two 
of the men say they are sweet ; two say, they are 
sour ; and two say, they possess neither of these qual- 
ities. Here indeed, is a miracle. For if these men's 
constitutions be in every respect alike, this difference 
of opinion cannot exist. But again, suppose a certain 
number of men to possess ali the senses which belong 
to human nature, yet it is evident, that the same 
sense, in different individuals, differs in activity and 
acuteness ; and different individuals differ widely in 
the discriminating power of each sense. Thus, some 
can discriminate colors more correctly than others ; 
while others can detect differences in objects of touch 
which the former do not perceive. And perhaps two 
persons cannot be found in whom the same sense is 
equally susceptible, active and acute. Will this, on 
the moral sense hypothesis, account for the differ- 
ence of opinion respecting moral right and wrong ? 

Suppose twx) men undertake to point out the objects 
which possess the quality of black. One of the men 
possesses a susceptible and discriminating sense of col- 
ors ; while the other's is unpracticed and obtuse. 
Now, if both of these men have an idea of the quality 
of black, i. e. mean the same thing by this term, then 
it is evident, that some object possessing this quality 
in a sufficiently apparent degree, must have been pre- 



Right and Wrong. 31 

sented to the sense of the dull man ; otherwise he 
could not have known that there was such a quality 
in existence. And it is obvious that where this quali- 
ty was sufficiently apparent to be perceived by the 
man of obtuse sense, it would more readily be perceiv- 
ed by the man of acute sense. And so of other quali- 
ties. Hence, no difference of opinion could exist so 
long as the quality was sufficiently apparent to be 
perceived by the one whose sense is obtuse. And I 
think it will be admitted, that two opposite qualities 
cannot exist in the same object at the same time ; and 
that when a man mistakes one quality for another, 
there must be a sufficient resemblance between the two 
to cause this mistake. But two opposite qualities 
which are perceived by the same sense cannot be made 
to resemble each other. Thus, two objects may pos- 
sess qualities of color so nearly resembling each other 
as to be mistaken for the same, while their qualities of 
taste may be opposite. But sour cannot be made to 
resemble sweet. For as soon as it begins to become 
less unlike sweet, it begins to cease to be the same 
original quality. Therefore one quality cannot be 
mistaken for its opposite, on account of the resem- 
blance between the two. 

To return, then, to our acute and obtuse sense men. 

When a quality was not sufficiently apparent to be 
perceived by the man of obtuse sense, it would be gone 
from the object, for aught he would know ; but it 
could not resemble an opposite quality so that the 



32 Ethica. 

man might mistake this resemblance for the opposite 
quality itself. Thus, a piece of goods may possess the 
quality of black in such a degree that an unpractised 
man may be unable to determine whether it be black? 
or some other color which nearly resembles black. 
But so long as black is inherent in the goods, no man 
will mistake it for white, the opposite quality. And 
hence, I think the moral sense hypothesis entirely fails 
to account for the phenomena. 



CHAPTER V. 

TO WHAT, IN HUMAN ACTIONS, MORAL RIGHT AND 
WRONG ATTACH. 

In Chapter third, we considered human actions with 
reference to the mind of the actor, and with reference 
to the objects upon which they are produced. Let u& 
now examine them in order to see, to what and in 
what manner moral right and wrong attach. Let us 
commence with that division with reference to the 
mind of the actor. Of these the first class is inten- 
tional actions. We have shown the manner by which 
they are brought about, to be, by a conception of the 
proposed action ; by the determination of the will,, 
and by the intention, which consists in adopting those 



Moral Right and Wrong. 33 

antecedents which will produce the desired consequent, 
i. e., by the adapting means* to accomplish an end. 
Hence there are four things to be considered in every 
intentional action, viz : the conception, the determi- 
nation of the will, the intention, and the effect pro- 
duced, i. e., the action itself. 

Now, to the conception of an action, I apprehend, 
moral right and wrong do not attach. For, if they 
do, then a person cannot read intelligently any book 
which speaks of wrong actions, or be accidentally 
witness to any evil, without participating in crime. 
And the mere conception of a right action would con- 
fer merit on an individual. 

Of the determination of the will. — Let us suppose 
a certain action to have no moral quality whatever ; 
there then could certainly be no moral quality attach- 
ed to the determination of the will to do, or to refrain 
from it. For, the will is a faculty of the mind, which 
the Deity has created. The determination of the 
will is an exertion of this faculty. Now, there can be 
wrong in the exertion of any faculty only when this 
exertion is put forth in a wrong direction. The wrong 
then lies in the direction, and not in the mere exertion 
itself. Hence, moral right or wrong attaches to the 
determination of the will, as this determination makes 
to accomplish a morally right or wrong action. 

Of the intention. — We have already stated, that by 
intention, we mean, the adapting means to accomplish 
an end. Let us now enquire further into it. Take 



34 Ethica. 

an example of an action upon matter. Suppose a man 
desire conveniently to obtain water from a well. He 
first cuts down a tree ; then bores it ; then fixes a sta- 
tionary valve in it ; then attaches a valve to a pump- 
rod , and joins this to a handle, which he places in the 
top of the pump ; he then puts the pump thus com- 
pleted into the well ; and then pumps and receives the 
water. Now, if we examine this chain of actions, we 
will perceive, that each step in itself is a complete 
action ; and that each preceding action is a necessary 
antecedent to the next succeeding one, i. e., each step 
is a mean adapted to accomplish the next step. Each 
of these steps the judgment determined the will to 
adopt, as a proper antecedent to accomplish the end, 
which the will had first determined upon. Intention 
in the mind, therefore, is the determining the will by 
the judgment. 

Tracing the intention, then, we will find, that the 
man cut the tree with the intention of boring it, i. e. t 
the cutting the tree the judgment determined the will 
to adopt as an antecedent to accomplish the boring ; 
he bored it with the intention of fixing valves and a 
rod in it ; he placed the whole pump into the well 
with the intention of pumping ; and he pumped with 
the intention of obtaining water. 

In like manner, intention may be traced from the 
first determination of the will to accomplish an end 
to all intentional actions. And it obviously enters 
into all the actions anterior to the ultimate one, but 



Moral Right and Wrong. 35 

into this it does not enter. And we must observe, 
that, intention frequently enters into several actions 
beyond the last one, which we perceive. Thus : If a 
man take a rifle, shoot an individual and rob him of 
his money, we can perceive intention in taking the 
rifle and in shooting the individual ; these are antece- 
dents to the robbery. But we can trace it no further ; 
for, we cannot tell with what intention the man took 
the money, i. e., what consequent would be made to 
follow this antecedent. But no doubt, intention did 
enter into this action, i. e., the judgment determined 
the will to use this antecedent to procure a conse- 
quent. Perhaps, the man took the money, designing 
it as an antecedent to obtaining fine clothes ; and 
perhaps, he procured these to gratify pride. Intention, 
however, always stops in the action which immediately 
precedes the ultimate effect, which the actor has in 
view. And in intentional actions, as intention, i. e., 
the adapting means to accomplish an end, stands be- 
tween the first determination of the will and the pro- 
posed action, it is always mentally and physically 
right, t. e., the knowledge of the nature of things, and 
the proper antecedents have been possessed and used. 
Now, in no other sense than the one we have given, 
can intention enter, in any manner, into any action 
whatever.* 

• We frequently use the verb intend, the noun intention, the adjec- 
tive intentional, and the adverb intentionally, to express the determi- 
nation of the will. As, MI intend to live in town next winter;" 



36 Ethica. 

And to the operation of mind of determining the 
will by the judgment, which operation constitutes in- 
tention in the mind, moral right or wrong can attach 
only as this operation makes to accomplish a morally 
right or wrong action. Suppose a doctor to be called 
to visit a sick man, and from some reason or other, he 
should administer medicine with the intention of killing 
the patient, but from a misapprehension of the qual- 
ities of the drugs, he should give just such things as 
would restore the man to health. Here, I apprehend, 
every man would say, that the doctors determination 
was wrong, and that the intention of the doctor, i. e., 
the adapting means to accomplish this end, was wrong 
also, and because it made to accomplish a wrong 
action. We will perceive, that here the effect produ- 
ced is an accidental one, and that in the intention 
there are mental and physical wrongs, i. e., the willful 
end did not follow the antecedents used, while the 
guilt charged to the doctor's character results from 
the attachment of moral wrong to the determination 
of the will and to the endeavor to carry this deter- 
mination into execution, i. e., to the intention.* 

" He did it intentionally." " It is my intention to visit the Lake," etc. 
We have spoken of the determination of the will, and this mean- 
ing must not be confounded with the meaning given to intention in 
the text. 

e Dr. Wayland tells us that the moral quality of actions resides 
in the intention, and gives the following example to show it : 

11 A. and B. both give to C. a piece of money. They both con- 
ceived of this action before they performed it. They both resolved 



Moral Right and Wrong. 37 

Let us next examine accidental actions. — In acciden- 
tal actions, moral right or wrong cannot, in any man- 
to do precisely what they did. la all this both actions coincide. 
A., however, gave it to C. with the intention of procuring the mur- 
der of a friend ; B. with the intention of relieving a family in 
distress. It is evident that in this the intention gives to the action 
its character of right or wrong." 

It will be perceived upon reflection that, in this example given by 
Dr. Wayland, the physical actions, t. e., the placing the pieces of 
money in the hands of C, were designed as antecedents to two 
actions of opposite character upon mind, viz : the influencing the 
mind of C. to murder and to benevolence. It will be further per- 
ceived that, these antecedents in themselves could never have pro- 
duced the effects designed upon the mind of C, unless other antece- 
dents had been used in connexion with them, viz : language or 
signs. And had these other antecedents not been used, no further 
action corresponding to those determined by the will of A. and B. 
could have been produced by C, except by coincidence. And had 
the affair stopped with placing the pieces of monejr in the hands of 
C, all that could have occurred, would have been the attachment 
of moral right and wrong to the determinations of the will of A. and 
B. respectively. If, however, any action corresponding to those 
determined by A. and B. succeeded intentionally, i. e., by the inten- 
tion of A. or B., the receiving money by C, it followed by reason 
of this other antecedent's connection with the bestowing the 
money. And to these other antecedents, i. e., the advising to mur- 
der and to benevolence, moral right and wrong respectively attach. 
For, they are in themselves, right and wrong respectively. And it 
may be further remarked that, considering the connection of these 
other antecedents with the bestowing the money, A. and B.'s actions 
thus far, do not coincide at all, but are opposite in their character. 

The fallacy of this doctrine of Wayland, however, will be, per- 
haps, more easily perceived by adopting the reductio ad absurdum. 
Human actions are either right or wrong in themselves, or they be- 
come so from the intention of the actor. Let us, therefore, admit 
that, human actions receive their moral qualities from the indention 
of the actor, and that in themselves they possess no moral quality. 



38 Ethica. 

ner, attach to the determination of the will. For the 
will never determined to produce them. Neither can 
anything be affirmed of the conception ; because the 
identical effect was not conceived of before it took 
place. Nor can any moral quality be attached to the 
intention. For, the intention to produce the actual 
effect, did not enter into any of the antecedents to the 
consequent action. 

Let us next consider experimental actions. In these 
the determination of the will, the intention, and the 
conception, all have reference to the intentional ac- 
tions, which immediately precede them. And inten- 
tional actions, we have already considered. We need 
not, therefore, examine experimental actions with 
reference to the mind of the actor. 

Let us next examine actions with reference to the 
objects upon which they are produced. Suppose a 
person should produce the same effect upon a man and 

Wherever the intention be morally right, then the action, into which 
this intention enters, must be right also, and vice versa. Those persons, 
therefore, who sacrifice human victims to please the Almighty, per- 
form morally right actions. For, we will all admit, that to endeavor 
to please God is right. But it may be said, that human sacrifice 
does not please the Creator, but incurs his displeasure. What of 
that ! If men from an error of judgment believe, that human sac- 
rifice will please the Deity, and do it with this intention, i. e., adopt 
this means to accomplish that end, the intention, though mentally 
wrong, producing an accidental instead of the effect aimed at, is yet 
morally right, because it endeavors to do right, and in this intention 
r esidesjthe moral quality of the action, which is therefore morally 
right also. 



Moral Right and Wrong. 39 

upon a sheep. And suppose this effect to be death. 
I apprehend, men would say, that this same effect, in 
the one case, was wrong, and in the other not. And 
if we inquire why it is thus, I apprehend they will 
tell us, that it is wrong to produce death upon a man, 
though it be not so to kill a sheep. And this is the 
same thing as saying that, it is morally wrong to pro- 
duce a given effect upon certain objects, while it is not 
so to produce the same effect upon others. And this 
doctrine, I apprehend, is sound philosophy. But if it 
be said, that men, who hold it to be morally wrong to 
take the life of an innocent man, nevertheless in cases 
of hydrophobia, and in war, do not consider it wrong 
to kill men, it only confirms our position, that it is 
morally wrong to produce a given effect upon some 
objects, and not upon others. For, in hydrophobia, 
and in an unjust war, men are different objects from 
what they are when free from hydrophobia and not 
inflicting wrong. The sum of the matter is, that those 
human actions which are consistent with the will of 
the Creator, are morally right per se, and those con- 
trary to His will are morally wrong per se. And it 
matters not, whether the actions bS intentional, acci- 
dental or experimental, so far as relates to the actions, 
though intentional actions are the only ones which 
affect the character of the actor, as we shall see by 
and by. 



40 Ethica. 

CHAPTER VI. 

CONSCIENCE. 

We have seen in Chapter IV. that, right and wrong 
depend upon the laws which the Creator has establish- 
ed, i. e. : upon the will of Deity. And as in a State 
without a supreme power to prescribe laws, there 
would be no municipal law, and consequently, no legal 
right or wrong, so, without a moral law-giver, there 
would be no moral law, and consequently no moral 
right or wrong. And as moral right and wrong de- 
pend upon the will of Deity, every human action in 
itself must be either right or wrong. For, if we say 
that, there are some actions, of which the commission 
or omission is no violation of moral law, these actions, 
as they do not violate moral law, must be consistent 
with the will of Deity. The omission of them, how- 
ever, cannot be wrong. Thus : If a resident of Phil- 
adelphia, who has no obligation to keep him at home, 
go to New-York* or stay at home, he has done no 
wrong in either case. Neither, if a person walking 
along the banks of the Schuylkill, should pick up a 
stone and throw it into the water, or omit to throw it 
in, would he have done any wrong. There is, how- 
ever, another class of actions, the omitting to perform 
which is morally wrong. For, the will of Deity makes 



Conscience. 41 

them obligatory. Now, all men will admit that, there 
is something meant by the term conscience. And all 
men will agree that, conscience has a relation, in some 
manner, to moral right and wrong, and to nothing 
else. Some authors suppose conscience to be a faculty 
of the mind, which, independently of the reflective 
faculties, and independently of all previous ideas, 
teaches men what actions are morally right or wrong. 

We believe there is no such faculty, sense, or in- 
stinct, in the human mind ; but that, the ideas of 
moral right and wrong are obtained in the manner 
stated in Chapter IV. 

Now, there are six states of mind, which, I appre- 
hend, are comprehended by the term conscience. — 

1st. Moral approval and disapproval. 

2d. Moral impulsion and repulsion. 

3d. Moral satisfaction and remorse. 

Now, moral approval and disapproval must follow 
after intellections. For, if a man approve of any 
action, on any other ground than moral right, then it 
is not a moral approval. But if he approve of an 
action because, he believes it to be morally right, then 
moral right is in his mind. And it is impossible to 
morally approve or disapprove of any action, without, 
first, having ideas of moral right and wrong. If then, 
ideas of moral right and wrong always precede these 
states of mind, and if these states cannot exist without 
them, then, it must be evident that, these ideas cause 
moral approval and disapproval, i. e. f moral approval 



42 Ethica. 

and disapproval are the effects which follow the im- 
pressions of moral right or wrong upon the mind. 

And, I apprehend, authors have confounded moral 
approval with others of a very different character. 
Suppose a man to snatch a child from its mother's 
arms, and throw it under the cylinder of a threshing 
machine. Would not the mother become frantic ? 
Would not her feelings greatly disapprove of the 
action ? Yet, I apprehend, she would not, at the time, 
consider whether the action were morally right or 
wrong. Neither would she immediately, morally dis- 
approve of it. Maternal affection is not conscience. 
Again ; if we should be looking at three men trying 
to lift a bar of iron without being able, and another 
man should pick up the bar and walk off with it, we 
would all j )in in the applause. 

Yet conscience would have nothing at all to do with 
our approbation. And there are thousands of actions, 
of which we approve or disapprove, where the appro- 
bation or disapprobation flows from a part of our 
constitution very different from conscience. Taste 
will have much to do with it. The Indian besmears 
his face and puts rings in his nose, and thinks it be- 
coming to do so ; while persons of refinement disap- 
prove of these actions. 

Next; we are impelled by conscience to do those 
actions, the omission of which we believe to be wrong, 
and repelled from those which we believe to be wrong 
in themselves. And these states of mind are evident- 



Conscience. 43 

ly caused by the ideas of moral right and wrong, i. e., 
they are the effects which follow the impression of 
these ideas upon the mind. Hence, ideas of moral 
right and wrong produce feelings of moral obligation. 
And as moral right and wrong depend upon the will 
of Deity, if we mistake this will, conscience will im- 
pel us towards a wrong action, with the same force as 
though the action were really right, and vice versa. 
The same thing is observable in other cases. If a man 
mistake the moonlight shadow of a bush for a wild 
beast, he will be impelled to run with the same force, 
as though there were really a lion in the way. And 
of so great force are the feelings of moral obligation 
that, where a person firmly believes a certain course to 
be morally right, and an opposite course to be morally 
wrong, he must pursue the former at all hazards, or 
become miserable. Where the belief is firm, feelings 
of moral obligation will be obeyed. And hence, the 
phenomena of men dying at the stake rather than to 
renounce the tenets of true or false religions, are 
easily accounted for. Feelings of moral obligation, 
however, do not affect all men thus strongly. The 
ideas of moral right and wrong are but little attended 
to, and consequently make but little impression upon 
some minds. And these men make some other than 
moral principle, their rule of action. 

But, I apprehend, authors have also confounded 
moral impulsion and repulsion, with other feelings. 
We are told that, when we feel we ought to do so and 



44 Ethic a. 

so, this feeling is the moral impulse. If I understand 
the meaning of feeling that, we ought to act thus and 
so, it is, that we are impelled to a certain course. The 
impulse may be moral obligation, self-love, maternal 
affection, or any other. It is the moral impulse only, 
when we believe it to be morally right to do so, and 
to omit to do so to be morally wrong. Any person of 
tender sensibility would be repelled from an ugly 
worm. But who would suppose this feeling to be 
moral repulsion ? Now, when we feel that, we ought 
to do an action, because we believe it to be morally 
right, and the omission of it to be morally wrong, we 
are then impelled by moral obligation, and we are 
then acting under the noblest impulse of our nature. 
For, as moral right depends upon the will of God, 
when we perceive his will, and are impelled by our 
moral feelings to fulfill it, all things else to the con- 
trary, here is " action, godlike action." 

Next, of moral satisfaction and remorse. — These are 
states of mind, which occur after we have accomplish- 
ed an action. They are evidently produced by the 
ideas of moral right and wrong together with the con- 
sciousness of having fulfilled or violated moral obliga- 
tion. Every person can make himself conscious of 
the fact that, if he believe an action to be morally 
right, and feel under moral obligation to accomplish 
it, he will feel, after its accomplishment, a moral sat- 
isfaction with himself, — a noble elevation of mind. 
I presume most men have experienced this state of 



Conscience. 45. 

mind. And on the other hand, if happily we have 
not experienced remorse, we have but too many exam- 
ples of intelligent men, who having passed most of 
their lives in immoral practices, have at the close of 
life experienced all the bitterness, which this painful 
state of mind produces. 

Now, that the states of mind above spoken of do 
occur, I think no one can doubt. And I think it is evi- 
dent, they are brought up in the manner stated. Ideas 
of moral right and wrong produce moral approval and 
disapproval ; after these follows moral obligation, i. e., 
moral impulsion and repulsion ; we then act or refrain 
from acting ; then comes moral satisfaction or re- 
morse. And these states of mind, I apprehend, make 
up what we call conscience. 

But if it be asked why these states of mind occur 
in the manner above stated, we may also ask why 
ideas of danger produce fear ? or why certain objects 
produce love and others aversion. The only answer 
which can be given to these questions, is that, the 
Creator has made our constitutions such that, thev 
are acted upon in this manner. 

Now, from what has been said it must be evident 
that these states of mind may interchange. If we 
once believed an action to be wrong, and felt under 
moral obligation to refrain from it, but our intellec- 
tions have since changed our belief respecting it, we 
may now have a moral approval and feel under moral 
obligation to perform it and vice versa. And it may 



46 Ethica. 

be further observed that, we may morally approve or 
disapprove of other men's actions ; but moral obliga- 
tion, and moral satisfaction and remorse have respect 
to our own actions only. 



CHAPTER VII. 

SELF-LOVE. 

If a farmer who had two fields, could by the culti- 
vation of one in wheat and the other in corn, raise five 
hundred bushels of wheat and a like quantity of corn, 
but by the cultivation of the former in corn and the 
latter in wheat, he could raise one thousand bushels of 
each, and therefore he should adopt this latter arrange- 
ment, the impulse which influenced his mind to adopt- 
this system, is called self-love. Now, we have said 
that there are many actions right in themselves, the 
omitting to perform which is not wrong. To choose 
which of these we shall perform and which omit, is for 
self-love to decide. And moved by this principle, con- 
scientious men apply their industry to capital in that 
manner, which they suppose will be the most beneficial 
to themselves. On this principle also, the honest 
mariner ploughs the deep ; the economist curtails his 
expenses, and the emigrant moves to foreign lands. In 
a conscientious mind, self-love is always subordinate. 



Self-love. 47 

holding sway only in actions indifferent to conscience, 
and is in itself a noble principle. And a man who 
does not act upon it, can have no regard for his own 
happiness. In minds influenced but little by moral 
feelings, however, self-love becomes self-interest, which 
frequently has no respect for the rights or feelings of 
others, and which is generally the parent of selfishness 
and meanness. 

Now there are plainly many courses in life, all of 
which are indifferent to conscience. And it often hap- 
pens, that two or more objects of desire are presented 
to the mind, while it is possible to obtain only one of 
them. And were a person destitute of self-love, he 
would grasp after the object which most excited his 
desire, without respect to the comparative happiness 
which might follow. And where the enjoyment of an 
object was not considered wrong, and consequently 
unchecked by conscience, without self-love strong de- 
sires would be unduly gratified. And each man, 
though conscientious, would follow, after desire in a 
course of inutility and even perhaps of misery. 

Self-love regulates this tendency in the constitution, 
and by impelling men to seek for themselves the great- 
est amount of happiness, raises noble minds from a 
state of conscientious misery to moral happiness. 



48 Ethica. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

VIRTUE. 

If we inquire why a man is either virtuous or vi- 
cious, I apprehend we will find, that it must be either 
with reference to his determinations, his intentions, or 
his actions. If these be all morally right, the man 
must be virtuous. If they be all morally wrong, he 
is undoubtedly vicious. It is necessary, therefore, to 
examine each of these with reference to the character 
of the actor. And first we will examine them in in- 
tentional actions. 

First, Of the determination of the will. —A man, who 
resolves to do what he believes to be wrong, mankind 
I apprehend, hold to be a vicious character. And he 
who determines to do what he believes to be morally 
right, is considered, so far as the determination of the 
will is concerned, a virtuous character. To be virtu- 
ous, however, so far as the determination of the will 
is concerned, the will must be determined to do what 
the man believes to be right, because he does believe 
it to be morally right, and for no other reason. For 
although a man should firmly believe it to be morally 
right to pray to God, and should determine to do so, 
not however from his belief in its moral right, but 
merely because he expected in this manner to gain the 



Virtue. 49 

esteem of his fellow men, this man could not be virtu- 
ous, even so far as the determination of the will is con- 
cerned. 

The desire to do what is believed to be morally 
right, because it is believed to be morally right, must 
therefore, always determine the will, in order that a 
man may be virtuous with reference to his determina- 
tions. And this desire is always induced in the mind 
by conscience, and can be induced by nothing else. 

Second, Of the intention. — We have before explain- 
ed the meaning of intention. And I apprehend that 
so far as the intention is concerned, a person is vir- 
tuous or vicious, as the intention is to produce these 
actions, which the actor believes to be morally right 
or wrong. If a person believe it to be morally right 
to kill his neighbor and make use of poison to accom- 
plish this action, I cannot see but that so far as the in- 
tention is concerned, the murderer is virtuous. Every 
man who acts upon moral principle, must do that 
which he honestly believes to be morally right. He 
can do nothing else. And hence, if a person who acts 
upon moral principle be vicious, it must be from some 
other cause than the intention. 

Third, Of actions. — We have said that human actions 
in themselves are either right or wrong. Now if we 
suppose a person to accomplish conscientiously a given 
action, and we should go to those men who believe 
this action to be morally right, and inquire whether 
the person had acted virtuously or not, I apprehend 



50 Ethica. 

they would not hesitate for a moment in answering 
that he had. Neither do men hesitate in saying, that 
others act viciously when the latter conscientiously do 
those things which the former believe to be moral 
crimes. 

And this shows us the manner the human mind 
views the actions of men with reference to virtue. A 
man who believes certain actions to be morally right 
and certain others to be morally wrong, considers all 
men as virtuous, who conscientiously determine, in- 
tend, and do the former, and abstain from the latter. 
Moral right and wrong in actions, however, are im- 
mutably established by the Deity, and the opinions of 
men cannot affect them in any manner. And respect- 
ing what actions are morally right and what ones 
wrong, men may be in ignorance. And this ignorance 
of the will of the Creator may be unavoidable or will- 
ful. Unavoidable ignorance is viewed with compas- 
sion by the human mind, and from analogy we would 
suppose this to be the case with the Creator. If, how- 
ever, a man do those things which men consider mor- 
ally wrong, they do not regard the man as virtuous, 
though his ignorance of the moral wrong in his actions 
be unavoidable. On the other hand, willful igno- 
rance in itself is regarded by all men as wrong and of 
itself it vitiates the character. Ignorance, therefore, 
cannot make a person virtuous with reference to his 
actions. Now as moral right and wrong are immuta- 
bly established by the Creator, from what has been 



Virtue. 51 

said respecting determination, intention and action, it 
follows that that man only is virtuous who knows 
what actions are morally right, and what ones are 
obligatory upon himself, and conscientiously deter- 
mines, intends, and when in his power does the latter, 
and determines, intends, and does those things only 
which are in themselves right. 

But he who is really virtuous, possesses virtue. 
Hence virtue in intentional actions, consists in the 
knowledge of what actions are morally right, and what 
ones obligatory, and in the conscientiously determin- 
ing, intending, and doing only the will of the Creator. 

Let us next examine accidental actions with refer- 
ence to virtue. It will be recollected that in accidental 
actions, the determination of the will and the intention 
make towards an intentional action. We have there- 
fore, already examined them. The intentional action 
towards which they make, we have also examined. 
And as the accidental action which is really produced 
is in no manner a willful one, it cannot affect the 
character of an individual. There is but one thing, 
therefore, of which we need speak. And that is igno- 
rance of the means employed to produce the inten- 
tional actions, by which ignorance the accidental 
action is brought about. This ignorance also, maybe 
unavoidable or willful. If it be unavoidable, I ap- 
prehend mankind do not consider the moral charac- 
ter of a man to be affected by it. If a man should 
endeavor to rescue a person from a burning house, 



52 Ethica. 

and should employ means which to the best of his 
judgment were calculated to produce this effect, I 
apprehend he would be considered virtuous, even 
though the very use of these means should be the cause 
of not saving the person's life. If, however, a person 
undertake to produce an intentional effect, and the 
knowledge of the means to be employed be within his 
power and he will not obtain it, this man cannot be 
virtuous. For he does not care what effect his exer- 
tions may produce, and therefore he acts not at all 
upon moral principle. 

Next of experimental actions. — In these, it will be 
recollected that the determination of the will and the 
intention make towards and accomplish an intentional 
action, which is the immediate antecedent to the ex- 
perimental one. And as we have examined intention- 
al actions throughout, and as an experimental action, 
not being a willful one, cannot affect the character, we 
need not speak further on this point. 

And from what has been said, it will appear' that the 
definition given of virtue in intentional actions, is the 
same for all actions. It may be stated in other lan- 
guage thus, he who knows and conscientiously • does 
the will of the Creator is virtuous in the eyes of God. 
Hence, virtue is the knowing and, as far as in our 
power, doing the will of the Creator only, under a 
feeling of moral obligation.* 

* Paley tells us, that, " Virtue is the doing good to mankind in 
obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happi- 



Virtue, 53 

Now from what lias been said, it will appear evident 
upon slight reflection, that virtue may be progressive. 
A man who resolves to do what is right, may increase in 
the knowledge of moral right from childhood to ex- 
treme old age ; and consequently his virtue may in- 
crease from day to day throughout his whole life. 

Theologians may, perhaps, show this progress to 
continue through the endless cycles of eternity. Our 
inquiries have reference only to man ? s existence on 
earth. And not only is it the case that an individual 
may increase in virtue, but nations may become more 
virtuous from generation to generation. 

Virtue may also retrograde in individuals and in 
nations. And whatever may be the quantity of vir- 
tue in an individual or in a nation, vice will always 
be in an inverse ratio to it. It may be remarked fur- 
ther, that all our faculties, and all our feelings and af- 
fections, may be improved or impaired by habit. 
Hence he who would improve in virtue, should firmly 
resolve to obey every moral law with which he is ac- 
quainted ; and by so doing he will make his progress 
in virtue easy, and shut the door against vice. 

ness." If a man were east on an uninhabited island, he could no 
longer do good to mankind, and must therefore cease to be virtuous. 

6 



54 Ethica. 

CHAPTER IX. 

HUMAN HAPPINESS. 

Happiness is a term that can appropriately be appli- 
ed only to animate beings. We cannot with any pro- 
priety say, that a rock is either happy or unhappy. 
And if we inquire why a rock may not be happy or un- 
happy, I apprehend, we will find it to be, because the 
rock is incapable of experiencing either pleasure or 
pain. Now this explanation of the inability of the 
rock, will put us on the right road to ascertain in 
what human happiness consists, in what manner it is 
brought about, in what manner its degree varies, and 
in what way we may secure the greatest amount. For 
happiness is undoubtedly a consequent which invari- 
ably follows certain antecedents, and is regulated by 
fixed laws. First then, of what human happiness con- 
sists. — Man is composed of mind and body. And what- 
ever may be the essence of mind, we know that the 
body is essentially material. And but for the mind, 
man would be in the same condition respecting happi- 
ness, as the rock. The mind, therefore, is the thing 
that becomes happy or unhappy. Now if we inquire 
of any man why he is pursuing a certain object, I ap- 
prehend we will always find that he either expe- 
riences pleasure in the pursuit, or he expects to expe- 



Human Happiness. 55 

rience pleasure in the possession, i. e. ? to be ultimate- 
ly made happy. And I apprehend, that human happi- 
ness consists in nothing else than in the experiencing 
pleasure. 

The musician cultivates music because he experiences 
pleasure in the concord of sweet sounds. And his 
happiness, so far as music affects it, consists in this 
pleasure. The devout man cultivates religion, in 
which he experiences pleasure, and he expects ulti- 
mately to experience the pleasure of the blest in para- 
dise. And from this it follows, that all men will not 
derive their happiness from the same objects, unless 
their constitutions be alike affected by those objects. 
But this is not the case. One man experiences most 
pleasure in literature, another in painting, another in 
the exercise of his physical faculties, and so on. But 
in whatever walk or occupation in life a man may be 
happy, his happiness consists in experiencing pleasure. 
Pain is the opposite of pleasure, and misery its conse- 
quent. It is, however, not sufficient for happiness that 
a man should be free from pain. Happiness is a posi- 
tive thing, and pleasure must be experienced or hap- 
piness cannot exist. When a person is in a sound 
sleep, free from dreams, he experiences neither pleasure 
nor pain ; he is neither happy nor unhappy. This 
part of our existence, nature has reserved for herself, 
that she may invigorate the faculties and apply her 
healing hand to the wounds of mind and body. 

Next, of the manner in which human happiness is 



56 Ethica. 

brought about. — We have attributed happiness to the 
mind. It is, however, by means of the body that the 
mind becomes acquainted with the external world. 
If we should suppose a person to come into life with- 
out any sense of touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing, 
such a person could not know anything w r hatever 
about the world, and could not be happy or miserable 
in it. 

Now, I apprehend, our constitutions are such, that 
we experience a conscious pleasure in discovering the 
mere existence of things. This may be noticed in a 
child. How pleased it is to discover objects of which 
before it had no knowledge. And every chemist who 
has discovered an elementary substance, or new com- 
pound, can testify to the same fact. And we have all 
heard what excess of pleasure Newton experienced 
when he discovered the universal law of gravitation; 
and how Columbus was overwhelmed with joy upon 
his discovering America. 

But our bodies not only make us acquainted with 
the existence of objects, but also with their qualities. 
And the qualities of objects affect the mind in two 
ways. First, when perception is preceded by sensa- 
tion, we immediately experience pleasure or pain from 
these qualities. Thus, the perception of- sweet in 
honey is preceded by a sensation upon the organ of 
taste, and we immediately experience pleasure. And 
an object may be taken into the stomach, whose qual- 
ities will produce sensations of pleasure or pain, before 



Human Happiness. 57 

we perceive those qualities to be inherent in the ob- 
ject. Second, when perception is to be followed by 
sensation, the qualities of objects awaken in the mind 
desire or aversion. Thus, we may perceive, by the 
eye and sense of smell, certain qualities in an apple, 
and these perceived qualities awaken in the mind a 
desire to apply them to the palate. But desire may 
also arise from the perception of certain circumstances, 
relations or conditions, which we may suppose will 
make us happy. Thus, one man may desire a civil 
office, another military glory, a third intellectual dis- 
tinct ion, and so on. Now the gratification of desire 
is the applying some perceived qualities, circum- 
stances, relations or conditions, to that part of our 
constitutions, upon which they will produce sensations 
of pleasure. 

But again, we experience pleasure by the exercise 
of our mental faculties, in comparing ideas, in tracing 
resemblances and differences, in tracing dependencies 
and relations and in contemplating the works of 
creation, &c. Hence, human happiness is brought 
about by sensations upon our organs of sense, and by 
exercising our mental and corporeal faculties upon sub- 
jects and objects, whose inherent qualities produce plea- 
sure. 

Next of the degree of happiness. — This will always 
vary directly as the itensity of the pleasure experi- 
enced. Thus, two persons may both experience plea- 
sure from strains of music. In one, however, the plea- 



58 Ethica. 

sure may be more intense, and consequently he will de- 
rive a greater degree of happiness from music than the 
other. And thus "it is with every source from which 
men derive happiness. 

Next of the greatest amount of happiness. — In esti- 
mating the greatest amount of happiness which any 
person may enjoy, we must take time into the account. 
If a man whose life was thirty years, should be made 
happy in the highest degree by the use of his eyes for 
ten years, and then become blind, he could not expe- 
rience as great an amount of happiness from the eye, 
as he would have done had his sight remained with 
him through life. And the same may be said of every 
source of happiness. Hence a man will enjoy the 
greatest amount of happiness from any source, when 
that source supplies him from the cradle to the tomb. 
But a person* cannot enjoy the greatest amount of 
happiness of which human nature is capable, unless 
he can draw from every source, from which a man 
with perfect faculties may derive happiness. A deaf 
man, whose life should be just as long as another's 
who had all his faculties perfect, could not enjoy as 
great an amount of happiness as the other. 

For the latter has one more source than the former 
from which to derive happiness. Now every part of 
mind and body is a source of happiness. And if an 
individual would secure to himself the greatest amount 
of happiness of which his being is capable, he must 
watch over all the springs of happiness, and see that 
none be dried up by iguorance or folly. 



Human Happiness. 59 

We may remark further, that when we experience 
pain, we are sure that some harm is affecting our con- 
stitution. This harm is sometimes very slight and we 
soon recover from it. Sometimes, however, it is very 
serious, and deprives us even of life. But when we 
experience pleasure, we are not so sure that no harm 
is done us. A man may experience pleasure in eating 
a good dinner, but that very dinner may make him 
sick. Hence, it is necessary that knowledge should 
direct our enjoyments in a certain manner and amount. 

Now it belongs to the political economist to explain 
in what way objects for our physical happiness may 
be obtained. It belongs to the physician to show in 
what manner these blessings may be used consistently 
with health. And the mental philosopher must ex- 
plain the laws of mind which cannot be violated with- 
out loss of happiness. It remains for us in a future 
chapter to show the will of the Creator respecting hu- 
man happiness. 



60 Ethica. 



PART II. 



CHAPTER I. 



THE WILL OF DEITY. 



If we admit that everything which exists, has been 
created by an omniscient Creator, it will follow, that 
each particular thing must have been created by de- 
sign. For, au intelligent machinist makes no particu- 
lar item in the mechanism which he constructs, with- 
out design. Each particular part is always intended 
to perform some function, to add strength or dura- 
bility, to give beauty, or to fill up some void which 
might occur in the arrangement. And as the human 
machinist does not make any thing without design, it 
is very unreasonable, and indeed absurd, to suppose 
that an omniscient being should. 

Now if we knew all the designs of the Creator re- 
specting the existence of each thing created on earth, 
aud respecting its relations to other things, we would 
then be acquainted with the whole will of Deity re- 
specting the world and the things in it. For, the will 
of Deity must have had reference to the existence of 
each object, and to the preservation of itself or of its 
species, for at least a period of time, and to each ob- 



The Will of Deity. 61 

ject's relations to other objects in a system. Whether 
man will ever possess such knowledge, we do not 
know. But. that much knowledge of the Creator's 
will may "be learned from nature is evident. For in 
all the works of nature, which we understand, we can 
perceive intention, i. c, the adapting means to accom- 
plish an end. And wherever we can perceive the in- 
tention, we may also discern the will of the Creator. 
For, we cannot suppose an omniscient being to produce 
accidental or experimental effects. Now all nature 
is divided into three classes of objects, viz : unorgan- 
ized, organized inanimate, and organized animate ob- 
jects. In unorganized objects, the human mind can 
perceive intention by considering the effects which 
they produce on organized objects. Thus, carbon, in 
itself considered, exhibits no intention- If, however, 
we be made certain of the fact that it is one of the 
elements that support vegetation, and that in the pre- 
sent system vegetation cannot exist without it, we 
may then clearly perceive intention. For vegetation 
cannot be an accidental effect. In the relations, there- 
fore, which unorganized objects bear to the organized, 
we can perceive the intention and discern the will of 
the Creator. 

In organized inanimate objects we can perceive in- 
tention in the organization itself, and in the relations 
which they bear to animate organizations. A grain 
of wheat possesses a germinating principle. This 
springs from the ground in an organized stalk, whose 



62 Ethica. 

organism is precisely adapted to produce the ear. 
Now in the organization of the stalk, we can perceive 
the intention of producing grains of wheat. Each new 
grain possesses a germinating principle, in which we 
perceive the further intention of perpetuating the 
species. In the relations also of inanimate to animate 
organizations, we can perceive intention. For, the 
animate cannot exist without the inanimate organiza- 
tions. 

In the relations of organized inanimate objects to 
each other, however, we can perceive no intention. 
For no one is in any manner dependent upon another. 
Unless, perhaps, there be intention in the relations of 
tendril plants and the organized objects to which they 
cling, or in the relations of organized objects to para- 
sital plants, such as the misletoe. Neither can we 
perceive intention in the relations which organized 
objects, either animate or inanimate, bear to the unor- 
ganized. For the latter are in no way dependent 
upon the former, but the former upon the latter. 

In animate objects, we can perceive intention in the 
physical and mental organizations, in the relations 
which one species bears to another, a,nd in the case of 
man in the relations of one man to another. In the 
physical organization of the ox, we can perceive inten- 
tion in each bone and muscle, in the eye and ear, and 
in the teeth. And in his mental organization, if we 
may use the expression, we can perceive an exact adap- 
tation of mind to pursue those habits which render him 



The Will of Deity. 63 

physically and mentally happy. And so of the rest 
of the brute creation. But except in the relations of 
sex, and of parent and offspring, we can perceive no 
intention in the relations of one to another of the 
same species in the brute creation. For one cannot 
assist another in acquiring knowledge, or in obtaining 
happiness. In the relations of one species to another, 
however, we can frequently perceive intention. For 
some species are carnivorous, and cannot exist ex- 
cept upon animate organizations. And as the Deity 
has created them, the intention of supporting their 
lives must have entered into other species. 

Now from what has been said, it must appear that, 
in many instances, we can clearly trace intention, i. e., 
the adapting means to accomplish an end, from unor- 
ganized to organized objects, both animate and inani- 
mate, from organized inanimate to animate organiza- 
tions and from one species to another of animate organ- 
izations. We cannot, however, trace intention in the 
reverse order. But on examination, however, of an 
organized object, either animate or inanimate, we may 
frequently infer intention to have entered into some 
other object. For, if we clearly perceive an object to 
be precisely adapted to receive a given effect, and this 
effect to be absolutely necessary to the well-being and 
existence of the object, we may clearly infer that if the 
Creator willed its existence and well-being, He intend- 
ed some object to produce this effect upon ir. And it 
may be laid down as a general rule without exceptions, 



64 Ethica. 

that where an object is precisely adapted to receive a 
given effect, and cannot thrive or exist without it, 
while there are various other objects precisely adapted 
to produce it, some one at least of these latter objects 
must have been intended for that purpose. In the re- 
lation of food to animate life, we have an illustration 
of the rule. Nutriment must be received or life can- 
not exist. And further, in animate objects, when it 
is necessary that an effect be received, and objects to 
produce it can be procured only in a certain manner, 
we may clearly infer intention to have entered into 
this manner. For the manner is a necessary antece- 
dent to a consequent, which is necessary. Keeping in 
view then, that where we perceive the intention we 
can also discern the will, we will proceed to examine 
man with reference to the Creator's will respecting 
his actions. 



Intention exhibited in Body and Mind. 65 
CHAPTER II. 

INTENTION EXHIBITED IN BODY AND MIND. 

Man is composed of body and mind. And in each 
of these we can perceive intention, i. e., the adapting 
means to accomplish an end. We will first examine 
intention in the bod; 7 . And the first end which we 
will notice, in whose antecedents we can perceive in- 
tention, is the animate life of man. 

Without inquiring into the manner the first man 
was brought into existence, let us see in what way ani- 
mate life is brought about in our day. The infant 
first begins to exhibit an organization ; these organs 
then begin to draw nourishment to themselves, and 
when they are sufficiently developed and nourished, 
they perform their several functions, and animate life 
follows. And as life cannot be an accidental or ex- 
perimental effect, the intention exhibited in the corpo- 
real organism shows that the Creator willed the ani- 
mate life of man. 

Next, the preservation of the life of each individual 
for a period of time. We find that in case of any 
harm happening the bodily organization, certain re- 
medial secretions are formed about the injured part ; 
and in whatever way injury may be received, whether 
by poison in the stomach, or by the sting of a serpent, 
7 



66 Ethic a. 

the body always makes an effort to free itself from the 
harm. And in this we may perceive the intention of 
preserving life. And although there be an adapta- 
tion in many things to produce harm, and even death, 
yet I apprehend it can be shown that they were not 
adapted for that purpose by the Creator. For, if 
they were, then it is the will of Deity that they shall 
produce their effects, sooner or later, upon the life of 
each individual. 

If they produce their effects immediately upon man's 
coming into life, then the Creator must have willed 
man's existence, and at the same time prepared means 
for his destruction, i. e., willed his non-existence, 
which is perfectly absurd. But if they are to take 
effect at a later period, then he who lives to old age 
and does not die by poison, has transgressed the will 
of Deity by doing so. I apprehend no person will 
believe this. 

But the animate life itself, in whose antecedents we 
perceive intention, is a necessary antecedent to human 
actions, respecting which we are to inquire into the 
will of Deity. And to enable the human mind to pro- 
duce actions either upon mind or matter, we perceive 
the intention in the body. Tn order, however, that a 
man may produce intentional actions, he must first 
have ideas. Let us therefore examine the intention 
in the body respecting ideas in the mind. It is well 
known that all our ideas of the existence of external 
objects are derived through the bodily senses. And 



Intention exhibited in Body and Mind. 67 

when a child comes into the world, the body immedi- 
ately begins to convey ideas to the mind. From every 
point to which the eye is directed there flow ideas of 
color, shape, and configuration ; every breath of air 
brings ideas of sound ; every substance which the body 
touches leaves ideas of touch ; everything put into the 
mouth adds ideas of taste ; and every thing applied 
to the nose gives ideas of scent. And in childhood 
the mind must very rapidly gather ideas. For then 
each object possesses novelty and excites and impresses 
the mind. And were these bodily senses wanting, the 
mind could not possess any knowledge of external 
objects. Now this knowledge is received by the mind 
in its passive capacity. 

Hence we can trace intention directly through the 
body from external objects to the ideas of them in the 
mind. But the human mind in itself has no power to 
create any new law, or to modify any law already 
established, but must take every thing as it finds it. 
Now inertia is a property of all matter, and gravita- 
tion affects each particle. Were the mind, therefore, 
not connected with some material mechanism, whose 
forces it can put into operation and direct, it could 
never remove a stone from its place. But without 
human action man cannot exist. We may, therefore, 
clearly trace intention from exertion in the mind 
through the body, and through extraneous antecedents 
to human actions. 

Now, many human actions, which we may clearly 



68 Ethica. 

perceive the Creator to have intended to be accom- 
plished, are left for man to perform. Some of these 
are indicated by the intention exhibited in the body. 
And the first we will notice is the procuring food to 
sustain life. We cannot doubt that the Deity intend- 
ed man to procure food. For organism and nourish- 
ment to this organism are necessary antecedents to 
man's animate life on earth ; and after a child has 
come into the world, the manner of receiving nourish- 
ment is changed, but it must still be received, or life 
cannot exist. Hence the intention in the relation of 
food to man must be clear. But food cannot be pro- 
cured without exertion, i. e., without human actions 
being brought about. The will of Deity must there- 
fore be evident. 

But again ; in the present system of things, man 
cannot thrive, and it militates against his very exist- 
ence to do without clothing. In many latitudes it is, 
perhaps, impossible for man to exist, even in a most 
wretched condition, without some sort of clothing and 
houses. But clothing and houses for man's preserva- 
tion and comfort are human actions, i. e., effects pro- 
duced by man's exertion. We may therefore clearly 
infer that the Creator intended man to procure cloth- 
ing, i. e., intention entered into the antecedents neces- 
sary to man's health and comfort. Again, in the body 
we perceive the intention of perpetuating the species. 

Next, of intention exhibited in the human mind. 
And the first intentional end which we will notice 



Intention exhibited in Body and Mind. 69 

is the knowledge of the nature of things. Know- 
ledge of things and of their relations to man is 
absolutely necessary to man's existence. Could not 
man acquire a knowledge of some things, and of their 
adaptation for food, he would immediately perish ; 
could he gain no knowledge of things adapted for his 
comfort, he would live wretchedly. Did he possess 
no knowledge of things which will harm him, he could 
never avoid them. But the senses without reflection 
teach man neither the adaption of things with which 
he is surrounded, nor the nature of his own constitu- 
tion. And hence we should infer, that intention must 
have entered into some active faculties of the mind ; 
and in the reflective faculties we find the means exactly 
adapted to accomplish this end. Man can learn by 
his own experience and reflection ; and by observing 
one man's experience, others can learn without expe- 
rience. And further, by observation and reflection, 
man can learn, and it is necessary that he should, that 
like causes, ceteris paribus, will always produce like 
effects. This implies a knowledge of principle. And 
the discovery of principles is the object of every sci- 
ence. We may therefore clearly infer that the Creator 
intended man to cultivate science, i. e., intention en- 
tered into the faculties adapted to this end. 

But again, without society, sufficient knowledge for 
the continuation and well-being of the human race 
cannot be gained. Society is, therefore, a necessary 
condition to man's existence and well-being, and must 



70 Ethica. 

have been intended by the Almighty. But unless some 
distinctions of right and wrong be in some degree 
observed among men, society cannot exist. And we 
find the human mind adapted to perceive, and impel- 
led to observe moral distinctions. And our moral 
constitutions influence us in two directions, viz : to 
reverence the Creator, and to respect the rights of 
others. These ends, therefore, are intentional, and in 
their antecedents we can perceive intention. 

xVgain, in accomplishing all the intentional ends 
which we perceive either in body or mind, man expe- 
riences pleasure, i. e., is made happy. By eating we 
both preserve life and experience pleasure, i. e., it is 
an antecedent to both these consequents. Proper in- 
tellectual exertion also is an antecedent to both discov- 
ery and happiness. By each sense we obtain ideas 
and receive happiness. And in the accomplishment 
of any intentional end of our constitution whatever, 
happiness also always follows the antecedents to this 
end. On the other hand, for the nonaccomplishment 
of these intentional ends, man always receives misery. 
If a man will not eat, he will destroy his life, one of 
the intentional ends of the Creator. But for his absti- 
nence, he will receive misery while life lasts. And 
this is the case with the nonuse or abuse of every facul- 
ty which the Creator has given us. And this teaches 
us that the Creator intended every faculty to be used, 
and that happiness was intended for man. But there 



Intention exhibited in Body and Mind. 71 

must obviously be a manner and an amount of legiti- 
mate use of each faculty. 

For, a man may eat innutritious food, or he may 
eat nutritious food to such an amount that he will re- 
ceive injury. 

Now the abuse of manner and of the amount of 
legitimate use of any faculty is indicated by pain in 
the faculty itself, or by injury to some other faculty. 
If we endeavor to test the smoothness of objects by 
the eye, we will soon experience pain in this faculty, 
because the manner of use is illegitimate. But all our 
faculties may be expanded by the legitimate use ; and 
the desire to use them will increase with this expan- 
sion. And hence, one faculty may be made to afford 
happiness in a higher degree than others, and to be 
almost the only source of pleasure. But when this is 
the case we will always find, that other faculties have 
received a positive injury. And mostly we will expe- 
rience pain in these other faculties ; if not, we will 
always experience that unhappiness which invariably 
follows from their nonuse. And this teaches us that 
the Creator intended us to use each faculty in a legiti- 
mate manner, and only to a certain amount ; and that 
this amount shall be such as will not interfere with 
the use of each of the others. And if each faculty be 
legitimately used to an amount sufficient to accomplish 
the end for which it was designed and no more, we 
will find the use of every faculty to be harmonious. 
And in this manner, each man would enjoy the great- 



72 Ethica. 

est amount of happiness of which his being is capable. 
And such evidently is the will of the Creator in man's 
creation. And such would really be the case in the 
world, were it not for the ignorance, the vices, and 
oppressions among men. 

Reflection upon the above. — The mind is the intel- 
ligent and active principle in man. The body is an 
organic mechanism. And this mechanism of itself 
produces certain effects independent of the exertion of 
mind. But in this mechanism we perceive certain in- 
tentional ends indicated, which can be accomplished 
only by the mind's exertion. Now, every intelligent 
machinist looks first at the properties and laws of the 
materials with which his machine is to work ; and 
frames his machine of such materials and upon such 
laws as will suitably adapt it for the intended busi- 
ness. In making the machine he has in view certain 
effects ; and to produce those effects is his sole object 
in making the machine. And by analogy, such is the 
case with our Creator. Now if any man derange the 
work of an artist so that it cannot accomplish the ends 
for which it was designed, he evidently thwarts the 
will of its maker. But the will of Deity is law, and 
he who thwarts his will is guilty of a moral wrong. 
But further, where the Almighty has adapted the 
means to accomplish an end, it is evidently his will 
that this end should be accomplished ; and the omit- 
ting to accomplish it is a moral wrong. Hence, those 



Right to the Earth. 73 

actions indicated by the exhibition of intention, in 
man's physical or mental constitutions are positive 
duties, and the omitting to accomplish them is moral- 
ly wrong. 



CHAPTER III. 



RIGHT TO THE EARTH. 



Man has been created and placed upon the earth r 
and of necessity he must occupy some locality. If he 
offered no resistance to the encroachments of wild 
beasts, he would not only be driven from place to 
place, but must eventually be destroyed. For, no 
compromise can be made with beasts of prey or venom- 
ous reptiles. They must be driven from the habita- 
tions of men or be permitted to exterminate the human 
race. Now, in the constitution of man we perceive 
that progress in knowledge and virtue is a law of our 
nature. And man is urged to make this progress by 
the love of knowledge, by the desire for happiness, 
and by necessity. Neither has the ultimatum of hu- 
man progress yet been reached, nor as yet can we have 
any idea of its limits. As yet, we cannot perceive 
any limit to the oldest science ; and new and fresh 



74 Ethica. 

fields are now and again opening to be explored by 
the human mind. 

In beasts, however, we perceive no adaptation for 
making progress. At the present time they possess no 
more knowledge, but are in every respect on the same 
footing as they were in the earliest ages. And evi- 
dently the Creator intentionally made the constitution 
of things as we find them. Human progress is there- 
fore, intentional, i. e., intention entered into its ante- 
cedents ; and the prevention of this progress must be 
contrary to the will of Deity. We may, therefore, clear- 
ly infer that man's right to the earth is paramount. 

But again, in the very early period of man's exist- 
ence but little knowledge of the arts, and almost none 
of the sciences was possessed. The actual history of 
mankind exhibits progress from barbarism. And as 
agriculture was then but little understood, man must 
have subsisted upon spontaneous fruits, upon other 
animals, or have perished. But at the present day, 
the spontaneous fruits of the most favored countries 
would preserve the existence of but a very sparse popu- 
lation. And in many latitudes perhaps it is impossi- 
ble for man to live entirely upon vegetable food. And 
we must suppose this to have been the case when man 
came upon the earth. And hence, at that time ani- 
mal food was a necessary antecedent to man's exist- 
ence. And at the present time if animal food were 
denied man, millions of human beings, if not the human 
race, must soon perish. Hence, in the relations of ani- 



Right to the Earth. 75 

mal food to man, we must perceive intention. But 
again, the use of beasts in the work of production is 
one of the first steps towards civilization. And until 
natural agents to take their place have been discover- 
ed and made subservient, beasts must of necessity be 
used. Hence, from what has been said, it follows 
that upon earth man is the favorite, and has his Mak- 
er's will to use the earth and the things in it. 



CHAPTER IV. 

RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 

If anv man were isolated from other men. he might 
make his habitation where he chose, use the fruit of any 
tree he liked, take those animals he wanted, and culti- 
vate the spot most convenient to himself ; and by doing 
so, he would be but exercising his moral rights. But, 
as we have seen, man's constitution exhibits the inten- 
tion of living in society. And the actual history of 
man shows, that men not only have a natural clo^ire 
for society, but cannot happily endure solitude. For 
those persons who have isolated themselves, have been 
among the most miserable of the human race. The 
constitution and attachment of the sexes would form 
little societies, parental and filial affection would bind 



o 



76 Ethica. 

together more members, and fraternal sympathy would 
further augment the number. And all this might be 
brought about without any member feeling, perhaps, 
the need of society for the purpose of gaining that 
knowledge requisite to his happiness, or of obtaining 
protection from the attacks of beasts. Thus the natu- 
ral bent of the human constitution, irrespective of be- 
nefits received, would lead men to form societies. But 
there are benefits to be received by living in society, 
which the Deity must have intended for man : for they 
can be obtained in no other manner. Progress in 
knowledge of any kind cannot be made without society. 
Every succeeding generation would be on the same 
footing as the preceding. No distribution of labor 
could take place, no art could attain to any perfection ; 
the knowledge even of Deity, and of moral right, 
would be but vague imaginings ; and maivs whole ex- 
istence, if it could continue, would be miserable in the 
extreme. But man's constitution shows that the Deity 
intended better things. Now w^hen men come to live 
in society, it is necessary to inquire into the laws of 
reciprocity ; for if these be not understood nor obeyed, 
many will not only receive no equitable benefit .from 
society, but often will be subjected to positive injury. 
We have spoken of the moral rights which every 
one might morally (i. e., by the will of God,) enjoy in 
an isolated condition. They are nothing more nor 
less than the free use of every mental and corporeal 
faculty in its legitimate office, upon any object of de- 



Right of Property. 77 

* 

sire whatever. No law of reciprocity could be vio- 
lated. And upon entering society, the only directly 
prohibitory modifications of natural right, which can 
be made upon any general rule, are the prohibiting the 
use of a certain faculty or faculties entirely, the limit- 
ing the amount of use of certain faculties, the prohib- 
iting the use of certain species of objects, and the pro- 
hibiting the use of certain objects (not species of ob- 
jects). Now we cannot believe the Almighty intended 
any man to be entirely deprived of the use of any 
faculty. For, He made each faculty for the express 
purpose of being used. Neither can society limit the 
amount of use of any facultv without manifestly thwart- 
ing the will of Deity. If, for instance, the quantity of 
food that may be eaten by each individual be pre- 
scribed, and this quantity be sufficient to satisfy the 
wants and consequent desires of the greatest eaters, 
the limitation amounts to nothing. If it do not satisfy 
the wants of those who require the most, the will of 
Deity is violated. For He made their constitutions 
such, that they require a greater quantity. The 
amount of use of any faculty therefore must be left for 
every individual to regulate for himself upon moral 
principles. Other men have nothing to do with it. 
But if certain species of objects be prohibited, these 
species are entirely excluded from every nian's use. If 
certain objects (not species) be prohibited, these objects 
can be enjoyed by nobody. If either of these arrange- 
ments be according to the will of the Creator, there 
8 



78 Ethica. 

must be some species of objects, or some objects, which 
no man has any moral right to touch. Such cannot 
be the condition of society intended by the Deity ; 
hence no direct prohibition of natural right can mo- 
rally, L e., by the will of God, be made by society. 

The only general rule, therefore, which can morally 
be established by society, is the permitting each indi- 
vidual to freely use all his faculties upon the unused 
stock of objects in the world. And as two men can- 
not use the same object at the same time, it is neces- 
sary to inquire into the manner in which the moral 
right of use is distributed. Now all objects which a 
man may receive from nature and appropriate to his 
exclusive use, may be divided into two classes, viz., 
land, with the things on it and in it, and wild ani- 
mals. Let us first consider land. 

If any one should pre-occupy any spot for an habi- 
tation, this spot would then be in use ; and as the use 
can be enjoyed simultaneously but by one individual, 
the pre-occupier, in whom the use is already vested, 
must have the moral right For, before the locality 
was occupied, each man's moral right to use it was 
equal . And by one man's occupying it, an unoccupi- 
er's right cannot certainly be made better. But the 
occupier has a vested right: and certainly one's vested 
right cannot morally (L e., by the will of Deity,) be 
set aside by another, whose right was but equal to the 
occupier's before the use became vested. And this 
doctrine. I believe, has been acquiesced in by all 



Right of Property. 79 

authors, from Cicero to the present time. But it must 
be evident that the right of possession continues no 
longer than a person continues the use. If he move 
away, the spot again falls into the common unused 
stock. 

But again : each individual's faculties belong to him- 
self; and it most frequently happens that the benefit 
to be derived from the use of one's faculties is not im- 
mediate. The farmer who sows his wheat one fall, 
receives not the benefit of his labor until the harvest 
of the next autumn be gathered. Hence the moral 
right of possession must continue until the benefits of 
labor may be received, though the spot be not actually 
from day to day used by the occupant. When, how- 
ever, a man has received the benefits of his labor, and 
moves away, he has lost his moral right by pre-occu- 
pancy, and he carries with him the fruits of his labor. 
The place is therefore in common again. 

But again ; he who brings a piece of wild land into 
cultivation, produces a utility inseparable from the land ; 
and if buildings and fencing be placed upon it, these 
also are products produced by man's faculties. And 
if a man's faculties be his own, whatsoever product of 
utility he may create, must be his own also. And to 
deprive any one of products which he may create, is 
tantamount to depriving him of the use of his faculties. 
This is evidently morally wrong, i. e., contrary to the 
will of Deity. Hence the utility created by bringing 
wild land into cultivation belongs to him who has 



80 Ethica. 

produced it, and he niay morally exchange it with 
another individual for an equivalent, or bestow it as a 
free gift to a friend. And this short account seems 
to me to explain sufficiently the moral right of enjoy- 
ing and transferring real estate. 

Concerning wild animals the same principles will 
apply. If they be domesticated, they belong to him 
who has tamed them. If permitted to become wild 
again, they again become common stock. Such is the 
common law and such, I apprehend, is the moral law. 

Now when things which are the immediate gift of the 
Creator, have been distributed among the members of 
society, according to the laws of reciprocity, each per- 
son may apply his physical and mental faculties to the 
production of utilities from the objects which he has 
received. These utilities, by political economists, are 
called products. And as each one's faculties are his 
own, the products of his labor are his own also, and 
he may morally exchange them with other individuals. 
In agriculture nature performs the greater part of the 
productive process, and the utilities are called agricul- 
tural products. In transforming iron from the ore 
into axes, man's ingenuity and labor have a greater 
part to perform, and such utilities are called manufac- 
tural products. The exchange of products constitutes 
commerce. 

Now the manner of acquiring property above de- 
scribed seems to me to be the way, and the only way, 
by which an individual may morally, i. e., by the will of 



Right of Property. 81 

God, obtain property. The earth and the things in it 
were intended for man : not for one man, nor for 
a certain set of men, but for the human race. And it 
is absurd to suppose that any one man, or any set of 
men, should have the exclusive right to the earth, while 
the rest of mankind, who have the same nature, and 
stand in the same relations to the Creator, should have 
no right to any of it. Suppose a tract of land con- 
taining many thousand acres to be unoccupied, and a 
certain man to claim it. It is evident that a small 
portion of this land would be all that he himself could 
use, and if other men be excluded from it, the remain- 
der must continue a waste. And if men have a moral 
right to claim large tracts of land, which they them- 
selves cannot use, and exclude others from them, then 
one man may claim a million of acres, another a mil- 
lion, and so on. And by such an arrangement, a few 
men might have all the land in the world, and exclude 
the rest of mankind from the earth. That such a state 
of things would be contrary to the will of Deity we 
need not argue. But we have shown that each man 
has a moral right to occupy, cultivate, and exclusively 
own any piece of unoccupied and unused land, which 
he may choose for himself. And without positive in- 
stitutions no man could have any thing whatever to 
show in favor of his owning land which he himself had 
not touched, and for which he had given no equivalent 
to another, who had previously brought it into culti- 



82 Ethica. 

vation. Money is a medium of exchange, and pos- 
sesses a relative value. And it is for the benefit of 
society (for, as political economists have shown, it aids 
in production,) that, instead of individuals exchanging 
the products themselves, which each has produced, 
they may make use of a convenient medium of ex- 
change. 

Now if an individual by skill and industry accumu- 
late money, has he not a moral right to give this as 
an equivalent for vacant lands ? that he has a moral 
right to make an exchange for property which another 
individual owns, we do not doubt. 

But no one individual more than another has any 
moral right to land which is in common. No such 
exchange, therefore, can take place between individ- 
uals. The exchange, however, in the present state of 
political arrangements takes place between individuals 
and governments. And in order that any set of men 
may convey a right to others, they must possess this 
right in properis -personis, or as agents convey the 
right of a principal. Now if monarchs, oligarchs, or 
senates, claim vacant territories for their own exclu- 
sive benefit, after what has been said, we need not 
adduce argument to show that it is an unrighteous 
usurpation. But if government be the agent, society 
must be the principal. In society, however, the moral 
right to possess the unused earth is distributed equally 
among the members ; and no positive institution which 
men may set up can morally (i e., by the will of God.) 



Right of Property. 83 

take upon itself the agency of any right belonging to 
an individual, without such individual's consent. 

But it may be said, that in the present state of 
morals an equitable government is a great benefit to 
mankind ; and in order to enjoy this benefit, it is ne- 
cessary that each individual should surrender, not only 
some of his natural rights, i. e., rights which he might 
enjoy in an isolated condition, but also some rights 
which he might morally enjoy in a society without 
government in strict obedience to the laws of recipro- 
city. All this we admit ; and we admit that govern- 
ments may morally have the supervision of vacant ter- 
ritories, and protect those who go to occupy them 
from the attacks of savages and marauding bands ; 
and see that among the occupants the laws of recipro- 
city be obeyed. And for such service the individuals 
are justly called upon to surrender an equitable por- 
tion of their goods as a recompense. But is it neces- 
sary to the existence of good government that each 
individual should surrender the right, which God has 
given him, of taking from the common stock, with 
strict regard to the rights of others, and subject himself 
to the hardship of buying it back again ? We believe 
it cannot be shown to be so. Does this arrangement 
best promote the welfare of mankind ? So far from 
its doing this, on the contrary we will endeavor to 
show that it is the source of the greatest evils to so- 
ciety. Now, there are but two inducements for an 
individual to invest money in wild agricultural lands, 



84 Ethica. 

which he himself cannot use. He either buys to sell 
again, or to let out to tenants. If he buy to sell again, 
he expects to sell at an advanced price. And if unim- 
proved land advance in value, it is because society 
needs more land to be cultivated ; and if these lands 
be kept a waste, society is injured to the full amount 
of the value of the products which might be produced 
from them. If, however, they be sold at an advance 
to agriculturists, all this purchase-money must be paid 
by the farmer for the privilege of exercising those 
rights which he might have freely e::joyed per jus Dei, 
had not government put this hardship upon him. 
This is the penalty for surrendering this natural and 
moral right into the hands of an agent making such 
arrangements. It is a moral wrong and an injustice 
to the tillers of the soil. And had this purchase money 
been left in the hands of the farmer to be converted 
into fixed capital, the productiveness of his farm 
would have been greatly increased, and so far would 
he be the happier, and society in general be benefited. 
To be deprived of this productiveness is an injury to 
mankind. I'ut, if an individual buy to let out to 
tenants, these tenants must be unable to procure land 
for themselves so near to any market that they may 
employ their labor with any personal profit. For 
no one would pay rent for wild land under any feel- 
ing of moral obligation without compulsion, for such 
land possesses.no utility whatever, except that which 
nature offers. Hence such tenancy is a coerced con- 



Right of Property. 85 

dition of the farmer, resulting either from the too lim- 
ited territory of a state, or from land monopoly. But 
providing there be unmonopolized territory on the 
frontier of a country, the tillers of the soil then have 
the alternative of becoming tenants, or of moving into 
a sparsely settled wilderness. In the latter event, 
they are deprived most generally of markets for their 
products, of profitable social intercourse, of suitable 
medical aid, and of schools for their children, and very 
often subjected to the demon cruelties of the relentless 
savage. All this is an injury to them. And if their 
children grow up in ignorance, in a representative 
government, this is a political evil. And further, in a 
state possessing a large territory, if the lands in and 
around the borders of the foci of society be monopo- 
lized, and emigration, to any great extent, takes place 
to lands unclaimed by deedal parchments, such a move- 
ment has a direct tendency to scatter the population 
of a country, to make men seek for themselves a wild 
independence, and to produce weakness in the gov- 
ernment ; conditions of society most unfavorable to a 
high order of civilization. This is an injury to the 
whole nation. 

But suppose all the lands in a country td be monopo- 
lized. By the nature of things, if the capitalists in 
manufacture lower the wages of their employees, they 
will endeavor to obtain employment in commerce, in 
the professions, and in agriculture. And as land is 
monopolized, the number of employers remains the 
same, while the number of those offering themselves 



86 Ethica. 

as employees in these latter branches of industry, is 
increased. The wages in all branches of industry, 
therefore, will fall. And as the man who does not 
possess capital of his own to which he may apply his 
industry, must earn wages from an employer in order 
to live, capitalists may reduce the wages of labor to that 
point which will merely keep the employees alive, and 
enable them to rear families sufficiently large to 
keep up a supply of laborers. Such alas, is the actual 
state of things in Europe at tlie present time. The 
feudal system of land tenure commenced in monopoly, 
and still preserves its monopolizing character, though 
variously modified by different States. And the result 
in most States of the old world is the entire subver 
sion of civil liberty, and the subjugation of man. 
And if in these States men cannot effect a change in 
favor of their natural and moral rights, nor emigrate 
to countries unblighted by monopoly, they must ever 
remain in this hopeless condition. In the United 
States, we have abolished the feudal laws of entail- 
ment. And as our territories are too large to be 
monopolized by speculators as yet, death distributes 
in parcels the estates of monopolists to men of liioder- 
ate means ; — and unclaimed virgin soil may still be ob- 
tained from government at moderate prices. 

These causes as yet prevent the control of labor to 
a great extent. They do not, however, free us from 
the evils resulting from the present system of land 
monopoly. And we Americans too, with the groans 



Right of Property. 87 

of Europe in our ears, are hastening on to bend the 
servile knee and do the menial service of capitalists. 
From the present system of acquiring property, we 
may trace a base disregard of duty in legislative halls, 
a corrupt adjudication of law in judicial functionaries, 
and a higher estimate set upon cunning and device 
than upon skill and integrity ; things incompatible 
with the stability of a republic, and destructive to the 
rights of man. And we might go on almost ad infini- 
tum, and show evils brought upon humanity by chang- 
ing the natural order of things which God established 
for man, and erecting in its stead artificial arrange- 
ments invented by feudal despots, or even dictated by 
the most enlightened, yet short-sighted intellects of 
sincere patriots. 

But it may be said, that if this natural order of 
things spoken of were adopted, industrious men would 
be deprived of one of the most secure investments for 
their accumulations, and so far they would be depriv- 
ed of liberty. That they would be deprived of the 
liberty of doing as they please is evident. But 
" civil liberty is natural liberty so far restrained and 
no farther than is necessary for the good of society. * ; 
And to do as one may please is inconsistent svith civil 
liberty. And in the natural state, without government, 
no such investments could be made. To be deprived 
therefore, of the privilege of investing in lands which 
are in common, is neither an infringement of civil nor 
of natural liberty. But it cannot be denied, that to 



88 Ethica. 

prevent individuals from occupying and owning what 
their industry may reclaim from nature, is a direct 
infringement of natural liberty at least. 

But it may be said, that it would at least be a hard- 
ship. If it be even so, the hardships which men would 
be made to endure from the natural order of things, 
would not approximate in any degree to the hardships 
which they are made to undergo by the artificial ar- 
rangements. But, I apprehend, we will perceive on 
further investigation, that the hardship feared is pure- 
ly imaginary, and that a real benefit would accrue to 
capitalists themselves as well as to all other classes of 
society, were things left to flow in their natural chan- 
nel. It will be said, that if the natural manner of 
obtaining property w^ere established, capital would be 
restricted, the accumulations of industry would not be 
of equal value to the possessors, capitalists not being 
able to employ their capital to advantage would flee 
to more congenial climes, the stimulus to industry 
would be taken away, the whole capital of the nation 
would decline, manufacture and commerce would go 
down, the nation would become poor, and wretched- 
ness and barbarism would follow. We will endeav- 
or to show these to be entirely imaginary evils, and 
that a movement in a directly opposite direction would 
take place from the very nature of things. Now r , it 
will be evident to every one having but a superfi- 
cial knowledge of political economy, that the sale of 
public lands to individual citizens by the government, 



Eight of Property. 89 

does not at all add anything to the wealth of the na- 
tion. There is but a transfer of value from the hands 
of individuals to the public treasury. The whole 
amount of values in the nation remains exactly the 
same. While these lands remain uncultivated in the 
possession of speculators, they are unproductive capi- 
tal yielding no item of national wealth. When they 
are resold to agriculturists at an advanced price, 
the speculator gains, but the national wealth is not 
augmented one farthing. And were all the capital of 
a country abstracted from productive channels, and 
invested in uncultivated lands, the nation would imme- 
diately starve. From which, it will be easily seen, 
that instead of men's investing and holding unculti- 
vated lands tending to benefit a country in a pecuni- 
ary view, it has a direct tendency to impoverish a 
nation. Now, if the capital which flows into unpro- 
ductive lands were precluded from this channel, and it 
should even leave the country without a return, the 
country it is true, would lose this amount of capital, 
but the national revenue would be decreased only to 
the amount of the deficit in the necessary expenses of 
the government, which deficit would have been sup- 
plied by the annual receipts from the land office. The 
amount of such deficit must be made up by products 
from the productive channels, and cannot be exported 
for a return. But unless the productive channels of 
other countries offer greater inducements, there is no 
9 



90 Ethica. 

danger of its leaving this. And if they do, capital 
will flow thither at all events. 

Hence, we see that the nature of things would di- 
rect the accumulations of men into productive channels, 
instead of channels not only unproductive of national 
wealth, but which cramp production. This would 
increase the national wealth, and the capitalists along 
with all classes would share in the benefit. 

But it may be said, that the natural order of things 
would set each one to work on his own capital, the 
complete division of labor to form constituent parts 
of a whole result could not take place, and consequent- 
ly we would lose the benefit derived from the great 
productiveness caused by such division. Now in 
every branch of industry which does not admit of a 
division of labor, there would be no loss, but a posi- 
tive gain by each one laboring upon capital of his own. 
For in this manner, each one would produce the most. 
And in those branches which admit this division in 
but a moderate degree, it is not difficult to see that 
men would form partnerships, and each partner take 
that division best adapted to himself. And as each 
division would then be plied by persons immediately 
interested in the general result, these would be the 
most favorable circumstances possible for production. 
But it may be said, that there would soon be no 
persons at all to be hired at equitable wages. This 
would not at all follow. For, every person who 
should undertake to reclaim land and cultivate it, 



Right of Property. 91 

must have some capital before he can do any thing. 
And if men received a full compensation for their 
skill and industry from an employer, no man would 
undertake business for himself unless he had sufficient 
capital to carry it on with the greatest advantage. 
Hence, every man before becoming a farmer on his 
own account, would obtain all the fixed capital to 
carry on the business in the greatest perfection. This 
would add greatly to the national wealth. 

But it may be said that under the natural arrange- 
ment, individuals would reclaim lands from the wild 
state, sell to others, reclaim again and again sell, and 
so on. This no doubt would take place, not, however, 
with harm but with benefit, until the profits of labor 
in agriculture were in exact equilibrium with the pro- 
fits of labor in each other branch of industry. And 
this equilibrium would not be brought about until the 
capitalists in manufacture and commerce received the 
due benefits from their capital ; the employees the 
due rewards of their skill and labor ; the professional 
man an equitable remuneration for his learning and 
services ; and the agriculturist the just relative value 
for his products. " A consummation devoutly to be 
wished," and that state of society into which, I ap- 
prehend, the Creator intended man to come. In a 
society like this, the frontier would be immediately on 
the borders of refinement, the population would be 
condensed by free will and natural tendency ; integrity 
would be esteemed and sought after in every depart- 



92 Ethica. 

ment ; each one's peculiar talents would take that 
channel adapted to themselves, for there they would 
be sure to gain their rewards ; the inducements to 
virtue would be stronger than those to vice ; wealth 
would increase, and happiness be found in every dwel- 
ling. In such a society, we would not of course per- 
ceive that great poverty of industrious individuals, 
which some have supposed necessary to civilization 
and to the advancement of national wealth ; a sup- 
position borrowing the appearance of truth from the 
actual condition of the civilized world, but which is 
as unphilosophical as it is derogatory of the benefi- 
cent Creator. The equality of talent and of indivi- 
dual wealth is no doubt but a dream. But that each 
individual may be permitted to secure for himself the 
full deserts of his skill and industry, we believe to be 
highly practical, in conformity to the will of Deity, 
and for the best interest of mankind. 



Marriage. 93 

CHAPTER V. 

MARRIAGE. 

Sexual love is common to the human race, and there 
are but four possible ways of arranging it, viz., by 
polygamy, by polyandry, by the free love system— 
meretricium — and by the marriage of one man to one 
woman. 

Now it is a fact that the number of births of each 
sex, and the number of each sex becoming adults in 
each generation, are substantially equal. That there 
may be slight variations from this equality in certain 
generations may naturally be supposed. But that no 
variation upon any general law of nature takes place 
is evident. For if there did, by observing two or three 
generations a considerable inequality would be per- 
ceived. And when population had increased upon the 
earth to many millions, an enormous inequality would 
be apparent in each generation. And by observing a 
single State, if in one generation the equality be 
destroyed by the ravages of disease upon females, or 
by the havoc of war upon males, the next generation 
brings along with it the equality of the sexes again. 
But if it be said that the general law of nature does 
not produce an equality of number of sexes, but that 
in a particular state the equality may be kept up by 



94 Ethica. 

the emigration of that sex, which is produced in ex- 
cess, this assertion must appear groundless . For let us 
suppose by the law of nature the number of males in 
each generation to be the greater ; if the equality in 
a particular state be kept up by emigration, it must 
be evident, that this emigration must flow to a state 
where disease or war had destroyed the excess of 
males, otherwise the inequality in the latter state 
would be greatly increased. But observation on states 
at peace shows that when an inequality caused by im- 
migration exists in one state, an inequality of an 
opposite character always exists in the states from 
which the emigration proceeded. Hence it must be 
evident that the equality of number of sexes is the law 
of nature. Now if polygamy or polyandry were uni- 
versally adopted, (and physiology favors the one as 
much as the other, and both have been practiced,) then 
many persons would have to lead a life of celibacy by 
compulsion ; a mode of life which the Creator clearly 
did not intend for man, and which is excusable only 
under compulsive circumstances, 
v But again, we must suppose that the Creator made 
all things perfect, for the well-being of the human 
race ; and as the number of sexes is equal, the happi- 
ness of a certain number of males must be consistent 
with that of a like number of females. Hence nothing 
could be gained on either hand by the free love sys- 
tem, which might not be enjoyed by judicious mar- 
riages. If we add to this the fact that the free lov r e 



Marriage. 95 

system renders the female degraded, and extinguishes 
that self-respect and highmindedness in man himself; 
while in marriage woman is respected and loved, 
man is proud of his and her position, sacrifices on 
either hand are readily made for each other's happi- 
ness, and children are loved, and in return love their 
parents, we cannot doubt that marriage was intended 
by the Creator. 

All authors of any merit are agreed upon this sub- 
ject, and we need not pursue it further. It is not, 
however, surprising that polygamy and free love 
should be advocated and practiced even in this en- 
lightened age, and in our own country of general intelli- 
gence. For it is common with men to mark the evils 
which flow from the abuse of a system, and regard 
them as the legitimate results of the system itself. 
And at the present day marriages are conducted most 
frequently upon principles of traffic, in which fortunate 
boors and simpering misers hold the best stands ; an 
abuse induced by the general avarice, and consequent 
neglect of right, which have come upon our country. 



96 Ethica. 

CHAPTER VI. 

GOVERNMENT. 

We have seen that each individual has certain 
rights given to him by the Creator, and that the Deity 
intended men to live in society. And as the Creator 
intended each individual to enjoy certain rightful pri- 
vileges, He must be consistent with himself, and could 
not have intended any thing to deprive an individual 
of the rights granted. Hence if anything hinder an 
individual from enjoying his rights, such hindrance 
must be contrary to the will of Deity, and the person 
has a moral right to remove it. Thus the Deity evi- 
dently intended a man with eyes to see, and hence a 
person not only has a moral right, but is morally 
bound to prevent, if in his power, any thing from 
putting out his eyes. And if men have a right to re- 
move impediments to the enjoyment of their rights, 
they must have the moral right to use those means 
necessary for this purpose. But suppose an opposition 
to preclude a person from his rights, and there be two 
methods of removing it; by the one, other persons 
will be deprived of rights which the Creator originally 
intended for them, while by the other the will of Deity 
would be in no manner thwarted. Here it is evident 
that the latter method, which will permit all the in- 
tentions of Providence to take effect, ought morally 



Government. 97 

to be adopted. But suppose an opposition to arise, 
and there be but one method of removing it, and by 
this method certain individuals will necessarily be 
deprived of rights which were originally intended 
for them, what ought to be done? If the oppo- 
sition be brought about by inanimate nature, or 
by beasts, the individual himself ought to bear the 
deprivation. For it would be unjust to free one man 
from misfortune by putting it on another. If, how- 
ever, the opposition be offered by man, I apprehend 
the case is different ; and those who endeavor to de- 
prive an individual of his rights, ought rather to be 
deprived of rights which the Creator originally in- 
tended for them, than be permitted to inflict an injury 
upon an inoffensive person. 

Now, in society, each individual morally possesses 
certain rights, which are either morally absolute, (i. e., 
cannot be lost by the individual in any manner,) 
or conditional (i. e., by the will of Deity become ex- 
tinguished by certain acts of the individual himself). 
Now man's very existence on earth is conditional. If 
he endeavor to live on arsenic, he will cease to exist. 
His existence, his happiness, and his rights, are all 
conditional ; they depend upon the laws which the 
Creator has established, i. e., upon the will of Deity. 
And if an individual violate any law of the Creator, 
he must lose the rights which depend upon that law. 
In society, each individual is morally bound to obey 



98 Ethica. 

the laws of reciprocity. If a man violate them he 
loses the rights depending thereon, and the society can 
not do wrong by taking them from him. And hence 
it is evident that a society has a moral right to make 
arrangements for protecting the rights of each indi- 
vidual. 

Now it will be evident to every one on the slightest 
reflection, that if all mankind would obey the laws of 
reciprocity, governments would not only be unneces- 
sary, but gratuitous burdens. And if we should con- 
sider the injuries done to production by governments, 
the cruelties inflicted upon home subjects and foreign 
foes, and the dearest rights of man crushed, we should 
be almost led to believe that mankind would not suf- 
fer more in a state of anarchy. But if we reflect upon 
the ambitions, the prejudices, the animosities, and cruel 
dispositions of men of the same and of different soci- 
eties, and consider the state of things these will bring 
about in anarchy, we will readily admit that mankind 
can not approximate to virtue and happiness without 
governments. General utility is, therefore, the ob- 
ject to be aimed at in forming a government. And if 
we regard a society internally, without reference to 
other societies, I apprehend that universal utility will 
always correspond to moral right. And viewing each 
civil society as a moral person, and a member of the 
society of nations, a utility which is universal in 
this society, must also correspond with moral right. 



Government. 99 

Now the purposes for which governments may mo- 
rally be created are three, viz., to protect a society 
from the aggressive injuries of other societies, to se- 
cure to each individual in the society the rights which 
the Creator has given him ; and to carry into effect 
any moral measure which will be of general utility. 

And a government thus established has a moral 
right to use those means necessary to accomplish these 
purposes. Unfortunately for man, the same vices 
which governments are intended to suppress, creep 
into the government itself, and direct its forces to 
illegitimate ends. Now as each individual in society 
must be engaged in some occupation of his own, every 
member cannot act as a govermental functionary. 
And hence it is necessary that certain offices be es- 
tablished, and their duties and powers particularly 
specified ; and also that certain individuals be ap- 
pointed to fill these offices. These officers must, of 
course, receive a remuneration for their services j 
and to accomplish the objects for which the offices are 
created requires means. These things constitute the 
expenses of government, and they must be furnished 
by the society. Hence, to form a government, each 
individual must surrender a ratio of his property to 
society ; each individual must also surrender to society 
the right of self-protection, so far as society is able to 
protect him ; reserving to himself the right of self- 
defence in cases where society's agents cannot know 
his distress and be present to protect him ; each in- 



100 Ethica. 

dividual must surrender to society the right to settle 
disputes between individuals, and to redress wrongs; 
and each individual must surrender to society the 
right to make laws for the government of every mem- 
ber. The remaining natural rights of each individual 
remain with himself, and if they be taken away it is 
tyranny. 



CONCLUDING BEMARKS. 

We will conclude our outline here. Morality is a 
subject as broad as the actions which man can perform. 
No writer could investigate all the circumstances un- 
der which human actions may be produced. Such a 
#ork could not be read if it were written. And we 
are of the opinion that cursory reading will not be 
sufficient to convince the mind of the truths set forth 
in the principles of moral science. Moral science 
must be studied carefully and diligently. And we are 
aware that none but the laborious student are willing 
to investigate thoroughly a large volume. And even 
he will become fatigued by prolix discussions, and 
either let an author carry him along at his will, with- 
out thinking for himself, or lay the volume quietly 
upon the shelf. We have, therefore, been as pointed 



Concluding Remarks. 101 

and concise as possible, breaking the shell of each 
subject treated of, as soon as we were able, putting the 
reader in possession of the substance of the matter, 
and leaving him, if convinced of the principles dis- 
closed, to carry those principles farther for himself. 
Books may stimulate thought and set men on the right 
road to think correctly. Each individual, however, 
must think for himself, or he will have no fixed prin- 
ciples of any kind. Paley, Wayland, Alexander, 
Smith, Hume, Dimond, Abercrombie and various other 
authors may be consulted by any person who may de- 
sire to learn all that able men have said upon the 
subject. And we apprehend, that such a course of 
reading will satisfy any one that he must think for 
himself: Many intelligent business men in our coun- 
try have concluded that moral science needs all the 
reputation of a distinguished author, as its truths are 
mainly supported by authority. 

A science, if thoroughly studied, will convince the 
mind of its truths, without the name of a Newton or 
a LaPlace. And we believe that moral science is not 
a dream, nor but an ingenious display of argumenta- 
tion. If authors disagree on many points, it is no- 
thing more than has taken place in the progress of 
every other science, And were the disagreement of 
authors a proof of the futility of any thing, no science 
could have made its way to be received as true by 
mankind. We believe that no science is better calcu- 
lated to improve the mental faculties, and elevate the 
10 



102 Ethica. 

character and conditions of men than this. It is not 
mere theory. It throws light into the practical walks 
of life. In a pecuniary point of view, it goes hand in 
hand with political economy to establish the wealth 
and happiness of a nation. Without intelligence and 
industry, a nation will dwindle into abject poverty 
and insignificance on the most favored soil and under 
the most salubrious clime. Without integrity and vir- 
tue, wealth is but a curse, and a nation groans in mis- 
ery, though the earth produce without labor, and its 
coffers be filled with gold and silver. In a republic 
everything relating to government depends upon the 
intelligence and virtue of the people. If private vir- 
tue and integrity be stifled by the cunning and un- 
principled, what can we expect but the most outra- 
geous corruption and oppression by the government. 
Under such circumstances, the natural ties which bind 
men together are severed, and each man possessing'a 
little authority becomes a little tyrant, and teaches 
' ; bloody instructions, which being taught return to 
plague the inventor," and the nation falls loaded with 
all the miseries which humanity can suffer, ^fter 
studying what we have written, think for yourself. 



CONTENTS. 



PART I. 

Page. 
CHAPTER I. 

Ethics... 5 

CHAPTER II. 
Idea of the Existence of Deity 8 

CHAPTER III. 
Human Action 13 

CHAPTER IV. 
Of Right and Wrong 21 

CHAPTER V. 
To what, in Human Actions, Moral Right, and Wrong attach ... 32 

CHAPTER VI. 
Conscience 40 

CHAPTER VII. 
Self-Love 46 

CHAPTER VIII. 
Virtue „ 48 

CHAPTER IX. 
Human Happiness 54 



104 Contents. 

PART II. 

Page. 
CHAPTEE I. 

The Will of Deity & 60 

CHAPTER II. 
Intention Exhibited in Body and Mind « . 65 

CHAPTER III. 
Right to the Earth 73 

CHAPTER IV. 
Right of Property 75 

CHAPTER V. 
Marriage , 93 

CHAPTER VI. 
Government , 96 

Concluding Remarks 100 



[ N«*v . 8 I860. | 



BRYANT, STRATTON & PACKARD'S 

New York City Mercantile College. 

18 AND 19 COOPEE INSTITUTE. 



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Sessions. — Morning session from 8 to 12 ; afternoon session, from 1 1-2 to 4 1-2 
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Employment- — The Principals and Teachers of this Chain of Colleges have an 
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To Whom it may Concern : Cooper Institute, New York, Nov. 30, 1859. 

It affords me pleasu' e to state that Messrs. Bryant, Stratton & Packard h;< ve, for a 
year past, had in operation a branch of Bryant. Stratton & Co 's Chain of National 
Mercantile Colleges, in the Cooper Institute ; and that it has been eminently successful, 
and promises to be an important adjunct to the educational interests of the City of 
New York and the country at large. I have found these gentlemen honorable and 
straightforward in their dealings, and am ful y persuaded that they are thoroughly im- 
bued with a sense of the importance of 'heir profession. That this is the prevailing 
sentiment, is evident from the class of patronage which they have received, and 
are receiving, at this point. They have now a large class in attendance, including the 
sons of some of our most eminent merchants and professional men. and I have no noubt 
of their ability to sustain themselves in their present high reputation, and to fulfill 
any reasonable anticipations of success in their enterprise of establishing a Mercan- 
tile College in the important commercial cities of the Union. Messrs. Bryant, Strat- 
ton & Packard are worthy the sympathv and co operation of all good men 

'Respectfully, PETER COOPER. 

We fully concur in the above statement : 

DANIEL F. TIEMANN. 
WILSO.n G. HUNT. 



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Answers to Nine Questions chiefly relating to the Lord, the Trinity' 
and the Holy Spirit. (1 Vol. Price, 45 cents. Postage, 21 cents .> 

Note — The foregoing list comprises all the Works published by Swedenborg himself 
during his lifetime. The prices affixed to each, barely cover the cost of paper, printing 
and binding: and the Society, therefore, neither gives credit nor makes any discount 
on its sales. Persons buying to sell again, are entitled to charge an advance sufficient 
to reimburse them for their trouble and expenses. 



COLLATERAL NEW CHURCH WORKS . 

FOR SALE, 

AT ROOM NO. 20, COOPER INSTITUTE, NEW YORK. 

The following is a list of some of the collateral writings of the New 
Church, which are thought to be among the most useful in explaining 
its doctrines to minds hitherto unfamiliar with them. We are compelled 
by our narrow space to omit many works which we should like to include. 

Noble's Appeal ir» behalf of the Doctrines of the New 

Church. Price. S8 cents. — A work generally regarded as the cheap- 
est, ablest, and best ever written in defense of the Doctrines of the 
New Jerusalem. 

Noble's Plenary Inspiration of the Scriptures Asserted, 

and the Principles of their Composition Investigated. With Appen- 
dix, illustrative and critical. Price, $1.50. 









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